CAI Z3 -68L55KI

CONFIDENTIAL


TITLE:

THE LONGSHORING INDUSTRY:

STRIKES AND THEIR IMPACT

AUTHOR:

Stephen T. Wace, 53 Thomas Street, Oakville, Ontario.



DRAFT STUDY

prepared for

TASK FORCE ON LABOUR RELATIONS

(Privy Council Office)

PROJECT NO.

55 (k) (part)

Submitted:

April 1968

This draft study is deposited for library use with the compliments of the author but must not be quoted without his written permission.



CONFIDENTIAL

TITLE:

THE LONGSHORING INDUSTRY:

STRIKES AND THEIR IMPACT

AUTHOR:

Stephen T. Wace, 53 Thomas Street, Oakville, Ontario.

DRAFT STUDY

prepared for

TASK FORCE ON LABOUR RELATIONS (Privy Council Office)

PROJECT NO.

55 (k) (part)

Submitted:

April 1968

This draft study is deposited for library use with the compliments of the author but must not be quoted without his written permission.

THE LONGSHORING INDUSTRY:

STRIKES AND THEIR IMPACT

(An extract from a confidential study done by Stephen T. Wace.)

APRIL 1968

THE LONGSHORING INDUSTRY (An extract from a confidential study done by Stephen T. Wace)

STRIKES AND THEIR IMPACT

Before delving into a detailed discussion of strikes in the industry, some general pertinent points should be made.

- 1. During 1966 the total working time lost by strikes in Canada was the highest in 25 years.
- 2. If the objective of some unions for wage parity with the United States is achieved, Canada's competitive position may suffer.
- 3. Output per employee in 1966 increased by only 2.2% in manufacturing in Canada as compared with the 3.4% increase in the United States. In the words of the Economic Council of Canada, "the rate of annual productivity growth has not advanced as strongly as was anticipated" in the Council's First Annual Review.
- 4. As might be expected costs per unit in manufacturing increased 3.6% in Canada and by only .6% in the U.S.

As can readily be seen from Tables V-1 and V-2, strikes in 1966 and the man days lost due to strikes and lockouts reached a peak since 1953 and were in fact the highest in twenty-five years.

The purpose of a strike threat is to create alarm; once work has ceased a main effort of each party is to give the impression that it has sufficient strength to carry on the strike indefinitely.

The economic forces set loose by such a work stoppage compel a settlement since each day the strike continues places additional pressure on both the employees and the employer to resume work.

Table V-1

Strikes and Lociouts 1955 - 1956 34/

Proposition	and the same of th	р _ө											x longshoremen involved = 4 150 or 18	* longshoremen involved = 0.2.37%	All longshoremen involved = 224,249.5 or 4.41%	34/ Source: Strikes and Lockouts, Ganada Department of Labour. 1962-1967
Syear	in Man-Days	% of Estimated available working days	0.14	0.15	0.19	0	0.15	0.25	0.19	90.0	0.1	0.11	0.07	0.11	0.17	0.34 34/
Lockouts in existence during year	Duration	Man Days	1,312,720	1,430,300	1,875,400	1,246,000	1,477,100	2,816,850	2,225,890	738,700	1,335,080	1,417,900	917,140	1,580,550	2,349,870	5,076,600*
Lockouts in	Morkers	Involved	54,488	56,630	060,09	88,530	80,895	111,475	95,120	49,408	97,959	74,332	83,423	100,535	171,870	411,459 x
Strikes and	Strikes and	Lockouts	173	173	159	229	245	259	216	274	287	27.	332	343	501	617
Strikes and	Lockouts Beginning	during year	166	155	149	221	238	251	201	268	272	230	313	327	473	582
		Year	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1953	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966

Table V-2

Duration in Man-Days of Strikes and Lockouts 35/

By Industry 1959 - 1966

, INDUSTRY	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	
						-			
		1	3		1	4,720		1	
Agriculture	9:	010	C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C	C472 -	042.64	12,150	54,460	64,650	
Forestry	1,443,390	1,040	2,700						
Fishing and		1	1	•	9 9 9	-	•		
Trapping	042 20	20,780	31,740	41,040	53,980	049'69	58,460	450,930	
Mines	020 998	431.440	383,940	773,700	498,730	1,190,810	1,470,770	1,971,930	
Manufacturing	84 660	206.290	652,230	197,720	192,330	91,890	237,240	296,250	
Construction	20,40	31,000	26,040	343,280	58,050	58,470	331,210	1,664,830	
Transportation	27,70	39.800	20,720	20,360	44,730	116,570	154,000	32,840	
Trade		4.750	20		1 1	50		. 20	
Finance	4 640	2.760	152,700	34,310	19,120	16,120	42,070	426,370	
Service Service Dunistration	3,690	94	8,040	950	410	20,130	1,060	169,300	
TOTAL	2,226,890	738,700	1,335,080	1,517,900	917,140	1,580,550	2,349,870	5,076,600	

Includes communication and Longshoring Longshoring strike = 7.22% of 1966 transportation Longshoring strike = 2.57% of 1966 total Transportation = 52.79% of 1966 total.

35/ Source: Ibid.

The following factors have a bearing on the seriousness of any given dispute: the duration of the strike, the stock piles of the product (where applicable), the availability of substitutes and the extent to which plants or facilities are made inoperative. The seriousness of a strike situation may be measured by the extent of curtailment of the available supply of necessary goods and services as neutralized by substitute facilities or materials. A national emergency strike may therefore be defined as one which has resulted in a dangerous curtailment of supplies of necessary goods or services where substitutes were not available.

In the United States and Canada public opinion appears to determine whether or not a given dispute shall be termed a national emergency, essential industry strike or a public interest dispute. Most journalists and indeed many authors tend to use these terms as synonyms.

George Hildebrand and Irving Bernstein 36/ consider a dispute to be a national emergency only when:

- 1. The impact of the dispute is national rather than purely local;
- 2. The product or service is essential in the sense that its use cannot be dispensed with or postponed without quickly and seriously impairing the health and/or safety of the whole nation;
- 3. The dispute embraces a substantial part of the industry;

Hildebrand, George: in Emergency Disputes and National Policy, 1955 - Harper & Bros. Publishers, New York. I.R.R.A. # 15. Pg. 25.

4. The strike has an actual as distinguished from potential effect, in that it imposes hardship rather than incovenience upon the economy and the public.

Other authors, such as Edgar L. Warren, 37/ are of the opinion that machinery to deal with national emergency disputes should be limited to public utilities and transportation except in times of war.

As Neil Chamberlain 38/ has pointed out, the whole structure of economic relationships in our society is based on the principle of specialization of services. In general each individual becomes attached to a unit which is geared to produce goods or services of a particular, specialized type. So familiar are we with this principle of specialization of labour, which forms the basis of our mass production industries on which our rising standards of living are largely dependent, that we have taken certain of its corollaries for granted.

While division of labour establishes our dependence as consumers on other producers, and it is this that we are most inclined to consider, it is equally true that the economy of specialization leaves us dependent as producers upon other consumers.

Thus when considering the total effect of a strike one must take into account the effect on the following:

• • 137

^{37/} Warren, Edgar L. "36 years of National Emergency Strike" Industrial and Labour Relations Review, October 1951. Pp. 2-15.

Chamberlain, Neil and Schilling, Jane. The Impact of Strikes. Harper & Bros. Publishers, New York. 1954. Pp. 8-22

- 1. household consumers of the strike product;
- 2. the direct producers, by which is meant (a) non-party members and families of all members of the struck unit, (b) commercial users of the struck product, (c) suppliers of the struck unit and its members;
- 3. the indirect producers who are (a) the suppliers of the commercial users of the struck product and suppliers of the suppliers of the struck firm and (b) commercial users of the products of the commercial users of the struck product; and
- 4. household consumers patronizing any of the indirect producers whom we will call indirect consumers.

Duration is of course vitally important in determining the effect of a strike on consumers; but duration is significant only because it effects each of the following three continua: (1) the cultural necessity for the product, (2) stock effect and (3) the substitutability effect. It is not a separable measurement, but rather something that enters into the measurements of cultural necessity, stock and substitutability effects. How long a strike is protracted would be of no importance if the struck product were considered unnecessary - i.e. with loss of production having no effect on consumption of the product and with highly substitutable products available in any case.

Government intervention is usually undertaken in the public interest; but what is the public interest? Can one look beyond the unreflective principle that intervention should occur when public opinion

- 138 -

demands it? One must consider that public opinion is quite likely to be undiscriminating and hence subject responsible public officials to unreasonable pressures to precipitate action even though it may not be warranted.

Generally speaking three objectives may be said to underline the Government's intervention into collective bargaining disputes:

- 1. to postpone or stop a strike or prevent a threatened "national emergency".
- 2. to aid in the process of bargaining and facilitate a settlement, or
- 3. to encourage terms of settlement believed to be more in accord with the public interest than a privately negotiated settlement.

However, intervention normally has the effect of postponing the economic pressures that provide the ultimate incentive to the settlement of all major disputes between labour and management.

Even if the Government delays intervention in the hope that economic pressures will force a settlement, experience again demonstrates that the stoppage will often be prolonged until the Government is forced to act. This is the case particularly if the parties have some reason to believe that the Government will sooner or later move to halt the stoppage. As a general rule, therefore, the less ready the Government is to intervene, the more likely that the parties will find their own solution through collective bargaining.

Unemployment in an industry itself and lay-offs in supplier

and user industries begin to cause hardships on individual workers and their families, with an adverse effect on the local economies. Thus it may be said that the pressures favouring Government interventions are great and varied in most disputes.

One form of intervention which from Appendix C would appear to be growing more common, at least in industries under Federal jurisdiction, is that of compulsory arbitration. In the past thirty years legislation has been enacted regarding seven disputes: five of these have occured from 1960 to 1967. Does this not suggest a trend toward greater intervention by Government?

Dean H.D. Woods has said that "a fundamental weakness in the Canadian system (or dispute settlement) is that it overlooks the positive role of the work stoppage as a catalyst in negotiations". 39/ Further he states that "the principal weaknesses in the Canadian system are the overemphasis on industrial peace; the extension of a system, originally applied successfully to public interest disputes only, to cover all disputes; and the failure to solve the constitutional problem of reallocating jurisdiction from province to Dominion or vice versa as the realities of evolving Canadian industrialism dictate". 40/

. . . 140

Woods, H.D. "United States and Canadian Experience: A Comparison" in Public Policy and Collective Bargaining. Shister, J. et al eds. Industrial Relations Research Association, New York, 1962. Pp. 231.

^{40/} Ibid. Pp. 236

These were very real problems in 1962 and still are today. However, the preservation of Canada's competitive advantage must be ranked as an important objective. The persistent trend of significantly high price and cost increases is most unlikely to be tolerable without sooner or later reducing Canada's competitive position in the world market.

It may safely be said that if the recent outburst of industrial chaos is not reduced to a minimum, Canada, her people and her economy will suffer.

Let us now turn to the longshoring industry and the record of work stoppages it has compiled over the last decade. Table V-3 sets out the name of the firm, the location of the cessation, the union and local involved, the duration of the stoppage, the dates, the number of employees involved, the man days lost and an estimate of the intensity of the strike. The latter is expressed as percentage of man days lost in relation to man days available. It should be noted that since 1956 there have been 539,363 man days lost through work stoppages in the industry and that 224,249 of these or 41.57% were lost in 1966 alone. At a glance one can determine that the trend is toward longer and more frequent strikes.

Several union officials when consulted on the matter of single company versus industry wide or regional strikes suggested the former were not feasible since shipping is not a consumer commodity and the source or brand name of the product or service is of little concern

LONSSHORENS:

	TISEEE	٠	1 () 1 () 1 () 1 ()	· ·	55.	1. \ e= f**	67.	76°.
	LOST BYTELIA	1015	63693.5	259.5	13750	22056	2339	4,228
0000	LOST	101	70.5 25200 42)00 454 64	259.5	30 13050 260 30 30	1050 7056 60 19890	1232 1444 295 630	78000 17000 1700 2700 2500
	SYAC	清	2000年十	-	- 222	367	127	N6W-4-
(2) E4	ELPLOYEES INVOLVED	451	1300 1300 1400 1600 1600	173	240 2900 140 30	150 196 737 737	29.2 25. 139.5 25.	2500 500 1700 1700 2500
+ CO H + CO H	ET.C	Aug. 31-Sept. 4	April 20-30 Aug. 21-Sept.13 Aug. 21-Sept.24 Sept. 3-24 Nov. 7-11	May 21-22	June 10-11 Sept.25-27 Oct. 10-12 Oct. 13-19	May 12-19 July 12 Aug. 18 May 25-26 July 10-Aug. 13	March 5 May 7-26 June 8-12 Oct. 15-16 Nov. 7-13	Sapt. 9-11 Oct. 4-14 July 23-26 July 19-20 April 1-May 29 Nov. 4-5 Oct. 26
	IOCAL	Ind.	ILWU 509 ILWU 505 ILWU 505 ILWU 505	IIM 503	Ind. Ind. 375 al Ind.	1829 1654 1842 1842	ILWU 505 1346 1846 1842 1654	575al 575al 1842 ILNU CNTU ILMU ILMU
	MOTICAL	Botwood, Mlfd.	Vancouver, B.C. St. John's Wild. B.C. Joast Prince Rupert, B.C.	Port Alberni, B.C.	St. John's, NFLD. Botwood, Nfld. Nontreal, P.Q. St. John's, Nfld. Hamilton, Ont.	iamilton, Ont. Hamilton, Ont. Toronto, Ontario Toronto, Ontario	Prince Rupert, B.C. Trois-Rivières, P.Q. Trois-Aivières, P.Q. Toronto, Ontario Hamilton, Ontario	Mtl., P.4. 5r. Mtl., P.4. 5r. Toronto, Ontario Vancouver, N.W. Hinister Sorel, P.4. B.C. Ports St. John's, Mild.
E E C H C E D T	WEIL	Anglo-Mild. Development	British Yukon Navigation St. John's Employers' Assoc. Shipping Fed. of Canada Pacific Stevedoring Northland Navigation	Can. Stevedoring - S.F. of B.C.	Wild. Employers' Assoc. Anglo-Wild. Development Shipping Fed. of Canada Nfld. Employers Assoc. Hamilton Harbour Comm.	5 Stevedoring Co's 5 Stevedoring Co's Cullen Stevedoring Co. 5 Stevedoring Firms	Northland navigation Three Rivers Shipping Three Rivers Shipping 3 Stevedoring Firms Stevedoring Co's	Shipping Fed. of Canada Shipping Fed. of Canada Stevedoring Firms Shipping Fed. of B.C. Sorel Dock + Stevedoring Co. Shipping Fed. of B.C. Nild. Employers Assoc.
	YEAR	1356	1953	1.355	1,960	1961	1952	1963

			- 142	
,	COL.		oil M	
LOST BY	; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;		505 7. 7.	C. \$ 4.545.5
EST TOOM	25.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05	22272 K	24.20 25.20	9463
DAYS	200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200		NX 05 - 11 X - 11 NW	
EMPLOYEES INVOLVED	0 K	000000000	250 th 200 th 20	174 24 24 4130 4130
DATE	Nay 21 Nov. 9-10 Oct. 24-26 Oct. 22-24 Aug. 10-13 April 17-June 3 April 24-June 1 June 15-18	Nov. 13-13 Aug. 9-12 Aug. 26-27 Oct. 4-13 Nov. 21-22 Nov. 12-13 Web. 25-27	Feb. 26-March 8 April 22-23 April 22-23 April 25 June 9-10 June 13-15 June 13-15 June 24-29 May 16-June 13	July 11-25 Nov. 11 Jov. 23-25 Nov. 17-Dec. 3
IOC. II	1739. 10349 1054 1054 1084.	1554 1554 375 1654 1379 11MU 885	1869 1869 1869 1869 1869 1869 1869 1869	1654
LOCATION	St. John's, Mild. St. Laurence Summerside, P.E.I. Tovonto, Ontario Hamilton, Ontario St. John's, Wild. St. John's, Wild. Mutreal, P.Q. Hamilton, Ontario	Hamilton, Ontario Victoria, 3.0. Hamilton, Ontario Montreal, P.Q. Hamilton, Ontario Gamilton, Ontario	St. John, N.B. Hamilton, Ontario St. John's, Nfla. Kontreal, P.Q. Toronto, Ontario Toronto, Ontario Hamilton, Ontario Hamilton, Ontario Halifax, N.S. Toronto, Ontario	Hamilton, Catario Hamilton, Ontario Sammorside, P.B.I. B.C. Ports, B.C.
FILES	Nfld. Employers Assoc. Shipping Fed. of Canada Coastal Stevedoring 5 Steveloring Hamilton Shipping Clark Terra Hova Services Nfld. Employers! Assoc. Shipping Fed. of Canada Hamilton Shipping Co. Ltd.	Havilton Shipping 35. Ltd. Pacific Coact Hydro carbons Various Co's Furness Vithy Co. Ltd. Hamilton Shipping Co. Ltd. Hamilton Terminal Operators C.M.R.	National Harbours Board Hamilton Shipping So. Ltd. Nfld. Employers Assoc. National Harbour Board Throate Harbour Comm. Cullen Stevedering Eastern Canada Stevedering Hamilton Shipping Go. Ltd. Furness Withy & Co. Ltd. Terente Harbour Comm.	Hamilton Shipping Co. Ltd. Hamilton Harbour Comm. Coastal Stevedoring E.C.M.S.A.
YEAR	1964	2002	1966	

TOTAL MANDAYS LOST

* Intensity = Mandays lost expressed as a percentage of mandays available

533563 AV. 2.23

HONTREAL'S 1945 INTERSITY IN HONTREAL TO INDUSTRY -

to the purchaser or user. This theory, however, in practice, has not been sustained. The unions have prided themselves on being able to "knock-over" one employer at a time on various issues and then use this as a club on the more stubborn firms. Thus a pattern of "whipsawing" has emerged. The shipsaw pattern does not hold on the River for contract negotiations, but rather in the day-to-day operations. For instance the union makes a unilateral decision on an issue, and then "blackmails" one company at a time until all have conceded the issue.

Industry executives have expressed the opinion that their companies would lose a large percentage of their customers if the companies were struck individually. Quite possible such a policy might force many companies out of business and hence their employees out of work. This is undoubtedly realized by the union and therefore the regional or area wide strike is preferred during negotiations.

It is highly unlikely that there will ever be an industry strike in longshoring for the simple reason that the I.L.W.U. on the West Coast, the I.L.A. on the East Coast together with the Longshoremen's Protective Union and the C.B.R.T. in Newfoundland would all have to agree to strike at the same time. Any industry wide strike which might occur would most likely be coincidental and the likelihood of such an event is remote. The possibility of regional strikes however is much greater.

I shall now turn to a closer look at the five disputes which have resulted in recorded cessations of work in Montreal since 1960. I say recorded because it is impossible for one to enumerate the number of

- 144 -

minor daily stoppages during this period.

The first stoppage began on September 23, 1960 when all stevedores, members of I.L.A. locals # 375, 1552, 1657 and 1845, totalling 2,900 workers refused to report for work claiming they were attending meetings called by the Union.

The cause of the dispute was the Brown and Ryan Limited, one of the stevedoring firms which the Federation represents, had a foreman that the union insisted on being removed. The union maintained that he was being too rough on their members. Brown and Ryan refused to discharge the foreman and, in protest, the stevedores refused to continue to work. (This refers to the now famous Lelièvre case.)

The walk-out affected all stevedoring firms that supply longshoremen in the Harbour of Montreal, with the result that the loading and discharging of cargoes was brought to an abrupt halt for four and a half days.

The dockers returned to work on September 27th when the Federation and Union agreed that the foreman would be relieved of his duties as such.

This was the first illegal stoppage which ultimately resulted in what may be termed a management victory.

However, it took a lot of time to receive an award and the relationship which resulted was less than desirable for either the

- 145 -

Company or especially for the individual concerned.

The second dispute also terminated in an illegal walk-out on September 9, 1963. The collective agreement between the Shipping Federation and the I.L.A. had expired December 31, 1962 with negotiations commencing the following month. The principal demands were as follows:

- 1. A two year agreement
- 2. A 35¢ per hour increase
- 3. Better Social security clauses
- 4. Better retirement plan
- 5. More holidays.

In March the longshoremen had rejected an offer of 12¢ per hour and negotiations continued with little progress being made. The issues were presented to a Conciliation Board.

On September 8th, the members of Local #375 held a general meeting and the leaders asked that the issue be submitted to arbitration. The longshoremen gave their acceptance. However, on the next morning they decided to act differently and a walk-out spread through the Harbour.

Reportedly it was members of Local #375 that inspired their "brothers" in locals 1657 and 1552 to stop their work. Within a half hour all the members of the various locals had assembled in front of their union hall to protest against the speed with which negotiations were proceeding.

The members decided to return to work on September 11th with

- 146 -

the announcement that an arbitration board had been established by the Federal Department of Labour.

The union leaders announced that a further general assembly would be held on the 22nd to report on the progress being made and to determine whether or not further walk-outs would be necessary to aid in the progress.

On October the 4th longshoremen of the three locals set up picket lines at all entrances to the Port of Montreal immediately stopping the loading and discharging of cargoes. This action stemmed from an argument made by the I.L.A. to return to work on September 11, providing an acceptable agreement be signed prior to September 26th. All appeared peaceful on the 4th.

However, the tone of the picketers changed on the following day and it became exceedingly difficult and dangerous for persons to cross into the harbour area. By October 8th, only harbour and local police had access.

Finally agreement was reached on October 11th and the Union members accepted the offer on the 12th agreeing to return to work on October 14th.

On June 15, 1964 members of Locals 375, 1657, and 1552 staged their fourth illegal work stoppage refusing to return until the condition of their pension fund was examined and an accounting be given of the findings of the inquiry promised as part of the settlement in October 1963.

- 147 -

The Federation took the position that the walk-out was an illegal cessation of work and informed the Minister of Labour that the Union would be held responsible for damages resulting from the stoppage.

According to the eight trustees, four from each the Federation and I.L.A., their mandate allowed them to increase benefits if warranted. The result was the the dockers returned to work on June 18 on the promise of Judge Lippe that the board report would be submitted to the members not later than August 15th and that the benefits would not be changed.

May 9 to June 16, 1966 is recorded as being caused by a dispute over parking privileges on the harbour property, it may be assumed that 36 day strikes do not occur over parking priveleges. Rather the real reason for the stoppage was the failure of the Federation and I.L.A. to agree on terms for a new contract then being negotiated. Since the parties had not been through the conciliation board stage required prior to a legal strike under federal jurisdiction, the issue of parking privileges was used as a scape-goat.

Since the terms of settlement will be discussed more fully in the following chapter, it is suffice to say that the following issues were in contention:

- 1. The size of the wage increase
- 2. the gang of cargo

- 148 -

- 3. strapping of cargo
- 4. sling load limits
- 5. health and safety
- 6. calls and recalls
- 7. job security

Although the issue of wages were settled on June 14, 1966, it was not until November 1, 1967, that the terms of settlement for the other issues were dictated by Dr. Laurent Picard in his Industrial Inquiry Commission Report.

It may well be assumed that although the terms of settlement are neatly written out, there is still a great deal of dissension existing over their interpretation.

Let us now turn to an examination of what a longshoring strike in a port, using Montreal as an example, actually means.

The first thing one must do in this regard is to establish what parties are affected. It should be recognized that if one were to rely on press clippings for such a task, the whole nation would be affected. However, as a jumping off point I have chosen to look at the parties directly concerned - management and the union.

Management here is used collectively to cover contracting stevedore firms as well as shipowners, operators, agents and port administrations.

Since it is assumed that the Port of Montreal suffered because of the strike, it was thought possible that either or both of the ports of Toronto and Halifax may have benefited from Montreal's misfortune.

From Table V-4-a, it may be seen that Toronto's income for every item reached a peak. It is particularly interesting to notice the increase in revenues derived from berthage, heavy lifts and terminal operations. 1966 overall showed a \$1,079,942 increase in revenue over 1965 which was supposed to have been a bumper year with 1966 expected to be average.

In Halifax (Table V-4-c) revenues derived from harbour dues and top wharfage increased considerably. Revenue from grain elevators decreased, however. Overall, revenues in the port increased by only \$62,704 over the 1965 figure. Thus it appears that the Toronto port may have benefited more than Halifax.

In studying the effect the strike had on the Port of Montreal as far as revenue is concerned, Table V-4-b shows that income from harbour dues increased over the 1965 level, monies accrueing from property rentals increased as did dockage and wharf space rentals. Only top wharfage and miscellaneous incomes under the heading of wharves and piers proved to decrease. Further monies from grain elevators, cold storage and permanent sheds all increased while revenue from the railway system did decline somewhat. All in all, despite the thirty-eight day strike the ports' revenue still increased by \$1,113,917 over 1965 which was consi-

TABLE V - 4 - a

TORONTO HARBOUR INCOME

1959 - 1966 (in dollars)

1956	486,759	205,840	33,356	3,761,454	N.A.
1965	481,722	67,875	17,795	2,840,075	N.A.
1964	423,802	N.A.	16,225	2,029,625	News
1963	394,139	N.A.	17,963	1,608,605	N. A.
1962	335,513	E STE	14,649,41	1,385,259	N & A &
1961	393,082 20/	No.A.	2,894	NeAs	376,764
1960	368,057 22/	N e A e	7,040	N.A.	363,897
1959	364,860 2a/	NoAs	5,218	N.A.	275,072
Revenue in dollars	Cargo Dues 1	Berthage 3/	Heavy Lifts	Terminal Operations 2/	Terminal Lease

1/ Amount billed to cover port overhead.

7

\$69,691 for 10 years pipeline deal expiring in 1961 71,365 71,169 Includes payment of (a) (b)

Berthage (barbour dues) instituted October 1, 1965, as direct result of increased labour costs. (N.A. * Not applicable) ig.

¹⁹⁶² Atlas Heavy Duty Crane installed, 到

Toronto Harbour Commissioners took over operation of terminals in 1962 Prior to this they had leased them to various parties.

TABLE V = 4 - b

LARITTHON

THOOME AND EDUTEDING .

1222 - 1266 (in delimen)

										TREND	1966	TREND- 196
		1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1959-1965	ACTUAL	(DECREASE)
Oper	ating Income								,			
(1)	Wharves & Piers Harbour Dues Property Rentals Top Wharfege Dockage Wharf Space Rentals Miscellaneous	\$ 106,804 39,955 2,919,916 680,781 341,256 101,065	115,402 34,838 3,531,060 943,719 540,267 92,669	125,672 43,281 3,738,843 1,013,284 490,905 133,136	128,921 3,744,640 1,022,291	119,321 64,405 3,691,230 1,056,683 489,733 142,703	343,952 66,740 3,939,085 1,193,010 458,629 165,193	381,411 76,785 4,844,446 1,352,402 652,826 164,284	4,818,984 1,600,270 677,655 146,950			
	Sub Total	4,189,755	5,262,955	5,545,121	4,895,852	5,564,075	6,166,609	7,472,154	7,778,585	+ 547.066	+ 306,431	(-240,635)
(2)	Grain Elevators Elevation Storage Rentals	1,614,008	1,552,460 1,118,004	1,841,474		2,779,572	2,795,967	3,017,874 1,294,565	4,265,013 1,387,393			
	Miscellaneous	198,867	130,121	73,473		51,675	247,880	308,717	151,610		4 482 862	Ono eliz
	Sub Total	2,765,254	2,770,585	3,106,210	2,888,552	3,983,613	4,247,807	4,621,156	5,804,016	309,317	1,182,860	070,545
(3)	Cold Storage Storage Miscellaneous	447,467 103,890	410,616 109,534	478,258 119,701		451,691 174,417	415,292 181,358	325,675 212,834	428,304 187,371			
	Sub Total	551,357	520,150	597,959		626,108	596,650	538,509	615,675	(2,569)	77,166	79,735
(4)	Permanent Sheds Shed Rentals Storage Miscellaneous	659,995 43,901 1,070	1,014,424 44,907 317	1,049,708 52,740 3,753	1,632,611	1,178,145 40,509 15,568	1, 331, 149 63,737 25,460	1,812,785 35,573 24,964	1,982,629 7,133 90,362			
	Sub Total	704,966	1,059,648	1,106,201	2,925,612	1,234,222	1,420,346	1,873,322	2,080,124	233,671	206,80	2 (26,869)
(5)	Miscallaneous Railway System	589,865 659,390	607,6 73 641,426	646,038 572,290	748,243 544,758	587,114 572,019	548,240 6 37,7 71	656,253 719,086	715,997	32,435		9 35,524
	Total	9,460,587	10,862,437	11,573,819	10,710,016	12,567,151	13,617,423	15,880,480	16,994,327	1,059,982	11,129,9	117 43,935
Opez	ating Expense											
(1)	Operation & Maintenance Wharves & Piers & Harbour Grein Elevators Permanent Sheds Miscellaneous Cold Storage Railway System Sub Total	812,941 2,373,098 320,304 730,534 501,433 987,969	1,243,344 3,120,751 346,120 787,820 506,447 974,688	1,312,952 2,918,109 400,774 901,697 494,089 900,840	1,524,350 2,924,131 467,175 793,518 488,254 898,374	1,502,892 3,435,744 420,023 625,103 472,824 870,642	1,436,306 3,685,580 404,777 634,030 466,911 797,875	1,698,350 3,444,338 393,617 685,144 438,175 805,009	2,542,556 6,140,196 1,085,139 3,737 605,662 1,068,282			
	and lotal	5,726,279	6,979,170	6,928,461	7,095,802	7,327,228	7,428,085	7,464,333	11,445,572			
(2)	Administrative Salaries Cont. to Penelon Plan Office Expenses Hiscellaneous	182,263 158,574 17,540 273,754	184,991 177,108 23,378 279,598	214,114 205,536 21,516 298,352		222,251 223,949 40,378 485,595	245,881 246,216 47,982 542,505	265,142 262,621 55,876 746,883	323,478 455,127 57,325 722,714			
	Sub Total	632,131	665,075	739,518	875,350	972,173	1,082,584	1,330,522	1,558,644			
	Total	6,358,410	7,644,245	7,667,979		8,299,401	8,510,669	8,794,855	13,004,216			
	Net Operating Income	3,102,177	3,218,192	3,905,840	2,738,864	4,267,750	5,106,754	7,085,625	3,990,181			

[•] SOURCE: National Harbours Board Annual Reports and Supplements.

TABLE V - 4 - o

HALIFAX

INCOME AND EXPENSE *

1959 - 1966

(IN DOLLARS)

	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	19591965 TREND	1966 ACTUAL	INCREASE (DECREASE
erating Income											
Wharves & Piers Harbour Dues Property Rentals Top Wharfage Dockage Wharf Space Rentals Miscellaneous	55,850 25,636 412,337 126,626 45,612 1,007	53,390 26,153 439,495 160,604 46,397 779	51,610 29,615 476,707 188,735 38,131 539	49,818 465,786 182,116	49,365 33,034 440,682 197,156 39,843 23,217	116,173 39,954 536,115 235,784 40,906 1,386	126,931 40,013 581,701 247,540 34,987 613	129,158 35,994 676,644 251,791 27,882 10,513			
Sub Total	667,078	726,818	785,337	697,720	822,097	970,317	1,041,785	1,131,982	41,722	90,197	48,475
Grain Elevators											
Elevation Storage Rentals Miscellareous	221,029 199,121 2,600 12,581	201,532 299,454 24,723	257,758 225,502 50 32,847		295,261 268,346 50 60,320	395,226 255,750 50 54,480	365,651 223,796 50 49,114	345,708 226,182 48 49,750			
Sub Total	435,331	525,709	516,157	527,068	623,977	705,506	658,611	619,688	37,213	(38,923)	(76,136)
) Gold Storage											
Storage Hiscellaneous	265,662 132,087	283,207 123,578	285,183 124,379		219,250 210,106	224,966 243,716	232,962 257,666	249,980 285,090			
Sub Total	397,749	406,785	409,562	385,705	429,356	468,682	490,628	535,070	19,456	44,442	24,986
Permanent Sheds											
Shod Rentals Storage Miscellaneous	114,505 45,164 167,012	123,099 435,580 163, 5 61	116,966 48,222 181,156		132,941 36,299 199,690	140,431 32,363 208,992	137,177 49,517 212,290	143,262 47,613 210,554			
Sub Total	326,681	330,240	346,344	190,547	368,930	381,786	398,984	401,429	14,460	2,445	(12,015
) Miscellaneous	71,921	67,343	73,770	338,577	67,732	81,782	70,605	25,148			
Sub Total	1,898,760	2,056,895	2,131,170	2,139,617	2,313,292	2,608,074	2,650,613	2,713,317	112,851	98,161	(14,690
orating Exponse											
Operat. & Maintenance Wharves & Piers Grain Elevator Permanent Sheds Miscellaneous Cold Storage	307,168° 354,202 332,900 82,527 362,222	* 374,819* 400,770 424,551 85,100 395,475	• 376,990° 505,481 357,336 67,636 449,893	440,625° 423,300 -377,782 -75,812 473,060	783,5534 450,360 336,800 77,893 413,528	* 389,723* 618,751 367,343 92,288 422,202	 690,974* 609,979 360,630 67,949 403,551 	429,941°° 812,911 936,554 3,303 557,190			
Sub Total	1,439,019	1,680,715	1,757,336	1,790,579	1,662,134	1,890,307	2,133,083	2,739,899			
Administrative Expense											
Salaries Contrib. to Pension plan Office Expenses Miscellaneous	80,858 38,064 7,468 63,515	83,223 40,437 8,504 74,545	88,079 51,796 8,884 89,898		91,359 46,835 7,918 99,935	95,643 59,636 8,808 98,989	78,158 55,380 11,673 103,107	97,086 159,019 11,491 129,720			
Sub Total	189,905	206,709	238,657	255,466	246,047	263,076	248.318	397.316			
Total	1,628,924	1,887,424	1,995,993	2,046,045	1,908,181	2,153,383	2,381,401	3,137,215			
Net Operating Income	269,836	169,471	135,177	994572	405,111	454,691	269,212	423,898			

- 153 -

dered to be a bumper year. However, the port's expenses also increased that year, cutting the net operating income by 43%.

From Table V-5-a it may be seen that, according to D.B.S., the three ports in question all received less ships in 1966 than they did in 1965. Toronto declined by 1.45%, Halifax by 3.88% and Montreal by 1.26%. Thus from this it appears that Montreal suffered the least set-back in the number of vessels arriving.

When one looks at Tables V-5-b,c, and it becomes evident that Montreal was able to delay the handling of the ships caught by the strike until a slack period in the summer. It is interesting to note the number of vessels entering the port in the pre-strike period, i.e. March, April and the beginning of May and the number entering in the two month period following the settlement. It appears to have taken about two months to clear the back-log.

From Table V-5-d it appears that the diversion effects, such as they might have been, were not felt until the very end of May for ocean-going vessels. In June it would appear that a few vessels of each class were rerouted or diverted to Halifax.

Unfortunately monthly figures for the Port of Toronto are not available for analysis. Qualitatively, however, officials felt that a few ships were rerouted or diverted during the course of the strike.

All in all one might conclude that had the strike not occured Montreal may possibly have enjoyed her best shipping season to

TABLE V - 5 - a

VESSELS IN/OUT BY PORT *

1959 - 1966

(WITH AVERAGE NET REGISTERED TONNAGE)

		TORONTO	NET REG'D TONNAGE (AV/VESSEL)	MONTREAL	NET REG D TONNAGE (AV/VESSEL)	HALIFAX	NET REC'D TONNAGE (AV/VESSEL)
1959	Ocean Coastal Total	2,431 552 2,983	2,025 1,951	5,612 7,967 13,579	3,248 1,244	3,001 1,752 4,753	3,839 1,075
1960	Ccean Coastal Total	2,317 1,966 4,283	2,180 1,645	5,308 7,695 13,003	3, 598 1, 291	2,779 1,646 4,425	3,889 1,299
1361	Ocean Coastal Total	2,205 2,198 4,403	2,478 1,718	5,639 6,666 12, 3 05	3,779 1,645	2,915 1,760 4,675	*,520 1,379
1962	Ocean Coastal Total	2,738 1,936 4,674	2,562 1,991	5,564 5,596 11,160	3,998 1,889	2,267 1,708 4, 975	4.309 1.427
1963	Ocean Coastal Total	3,072 1,372 4,444	2,72 7 1,828	5,383 4,986 10,369	4,028 2,263	2,011 1,563 3,57 ^h	4,551 1,511
1964	Ocean Coastal Total	2,755 1,398 4,153	3,090 1,919	5,921 5,188 11,109	3,932 2,186	1,960 1,599 3,559	4,950 1,638
1965	Ocean Coastal Total	2,695 1,096 3,791	3,298 2,272	6,959 5,089 12,048	4,1 1 9 2,292	1,908 1,614 3,522	5,570 1,630
1966	Ocean Coastal Total	2,623 1,113 3,736	3,214 2,488	6,832 5,063 11,895	4,354 2,503	1,905 1,420 3,385	5,360 1,734

. . . 155

^{*} SOURCE: Dominion Bureau of Statistics: Shipping Reports, 1959 - 1966

0		AIS
1	CONTO	PRIV.
TABLE V	TOT	VESSEL A

1959 - 1966

NI.			
PROJECTIC	1,009	1,127	2,167
TREIND	94 +	- 106	44
1966	1711	816	1,960
1965	1,137	836	2,073
1964	1,080	951	2,031
1963	766	1,279	2,273
1962	1,004	1,321	2,325
1961	814	1,366	2,180
1960	854	1,407	2,261
1959	862	1,474	2,336
	FOREIGN	DOMESTIC	TOTAL

* SOURCE; Toronto Harbour Commissioners, D.T. Weir, Comptroller.

TABLE - 5 - c

MONTREAL

VESSEL ARRIVALS *

BY MONTH 1959 - 1966

		1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1364	1965	1966	TRE	ND	PROJECTION
January	Ocean Going Coastal	0	0	0	0	0	4 O	3 6	12 5			1
February	Ocean Going Coastal	9	0	0	0	2 5	3 8	6 16	13 19	F +	2	6 8
March	Ocean Going Goastal	0 3	5 2	1 6	5 13	8	9 22	17 29	32. 140	+	34	9 16
April	Ocean Going Coastal	209 176	230 171	233 207	227 136	217 141	305 223	278 197	.27 5 229	+	12	255 183
May	Ocean Going Coastal	422	452 352	489 294	469 273	425 249	482 287	501 281	452 265		13 21	476 327
June	Ocean Going Coastal	471 362	478 336	482 3 24	466 291	397 276	479 265	465 291	421 268	140	1 12	462 295
July	Ocean Going Coastal	461 405	457 360	482 325	475 3 25	429 313	458 3 ¹ 10	469 283	484 3 08	+ 200	1 20	463 3 16
Angrist	Ocean Going Coastal	498 400	454 340	474 326	492 307	58 I 27 I	1439	472 325	474 232	90°) 849	4	454 - 311
Cantember	Ocean Going Constal	448 377	440 310	446 304	477 250	447 305	458 277	475 264	468	+	8	4 66 2 79
October	Ocean Going Coastal	487 3 82	475 331	474 330	514 279	460 278	458 271	538 304	.48 279	+	8	495 2 39
November	Ocean Going Coastal	454 312	484 331	468 310	483 291	473 304	448 235	491 303	511 231	+	6 2	479 304
December	Ocean Going Coastal	66 67	24 81	56 61	68 72	130 135	124 81	158 122	155 143	+ +	15	104 97
Sub Total	Ocean Going Coastal	3,516 2,890	3,499 2,614	3,605 2,487	3,676 2,237	3,363 2,287	3,667 2,349	3,893 2,485	3,855 2,361	+	63 . 77	3,666 2,393
Total		6,406	6,113	6,092	6,613	5,656	6,016	6,318	6,216	ung	15	6,073

. . . 15?

^{*} SOURCE: National Harbours Board Mr. Guy Reaudet, Port Manager, Montreal.
Note: Includes inland vessels.

TABLE V - 5 - d

HALLFAX HALLOUR

TOTAL VESSEL ARRIVALS .

1959 - 1966

		1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	Trend	1966 Projection
January	Ocean Going	183	170	152	163	135	163	157	172	-	4
	Coastal Total	133 316	106	153	164	159	132	130	93		
	20001	210	276	305	327	294	295	287	281		296
February	Ocean Going	160	167	151	146	139	161	136	161	- 1	5
	Coastal Total	129 289	94	130	106	131	120	116	122	-	
	10000	503	261	281	252	270	281	252	283		264
March	Ocean Going	184	153	156	188	181	183	194	175	eur .	1
	Coastal Total	186	130	162	180	163	154	166	159		
	TOTAL	370	283	318	368	344	337	360	.334		339
April	Ocean Going	117	113	129	113	125	142	145	153	** ;	,
	Coastal Total	183	131	156	171	202	180	171	123		-
	10181	300	244	285	284	327	322	316	326		295
May	Ocean Going	133	110	139	135	120	142	156	155	+ 8	1
	Coastal Total	130	133	148	156	139	171	160	150	4 (,
	IDUEL	263	243	287	291	259	313	316	305		200
June	Ocean Going	123	130	114	119	130	130	134	147	÷ 3	
	Coastal Total	137	150	144	150	147	161	148	151	+ 3	,
	IOUAL	260	280	258	269	277	291	282	293		277
Paly	Ocean Going	122	114	142	130	125	131	137	141		
	Constal Total	173	186	158	168	150	147	136	139	- 3	,
	TOTAL	295	300	3 00	338	275	278	273	281		285
August	Ocean Going	112	122	127	120	108	119	139	140		
	Coastal Total	167	185	174	147	146	142	150	139	** 1	
	TOTAL	279	307	301	267	254	261	289	278		278
September	Ocean Going	115	112	126	118	114	143	145	132		
	Coastal Total	108	123	108	121	112	131	132	125	+ 9	'
	10 081.	223	235	234	239	226	274	277	257		233
October	Ocean Going	127	123	114	176	162	1/45	133	129	<u>~</u> 1	
	Coastal Total	111	120	125	110	113	114	101	122	_	
	TO COLL	238	243	239	286	275	259	234	251		252
November	Ocean Going	137	113	130	122	121	114	122	128	+ 2	
	Coastal Total	96	108	101	96	107	103	125	74	+ 2	
	*O CAL	233	221	231	218	228	217	247	222		225
December	Ocean Going	155	151	175	163	149	161	151	132		
	Coastal Total	82	90	86	90	96	88	89	84	O	
	*Out	237	241	261	253	245	249	240	216		247
Yearly	Ocean Going	1,668	1 502	1 600	4 (
Totals	Coastal	1,635	1,578 1,556	1,655 1,645	1,693 1,659	1,609 1,665	1,734 1,643	1,749	1,765	+ 12	1,681
					10))	1,00)	1,047	1,624	1,556	∞ 2	1,679

^{*} SOURCE: National Harbours Board. J.R. Mitchell, Port Manager, Nalifax.

date. On the other hand the Ports of Toronto and Halifax may have suffered a good deal more had it not been for the strike on the River.

Let us now turn to analysis of the loss to shipowners or operators. It must be recognized that the operation of a vessel is a costly undertaking. The cost will of course vary depending upon the size, age and type of vessel. However, it is safe to say that when one considers expenditures for food, fuel, water, stores, repairs, spare parts and wages a fair estimate for any given vessel is \$1500 per day. Table V-6 shows the names of the vessels laid up by the strike and the amount of time for which they were caught. There were 84 vessels caught in the port for a total of 2,211 days. When calculated out, it is estimated that the strike cost the shipowners and operators a total of \$3,316,500 in lay-up costs. However, since an average vessel is in port for four days this figure could be reduced to a minimum of \$2,812,500.

This does not end the cost to the shipowners or operators however. It must be remembered that while the ship is sitting in a port it is not earning any income. This lay-up would probably be equal to one full round trip. Estimates on gross profit from one round trip range from \$20,000 to \$100,000 depending on the route, cargo and other variables. Arbitrarily let us say that a vessel on an average round trip grosses \$35,000. That means that the owners or operators were forced to forego \$2,940,000.

Thus so far the strike has cost the operators or owners of these eighty four vessels \$5,752,500.

Vessels Caught In Montreal During 1965 I.L.A. Strike

Paulo V 6

DAYS	7.	~	12	250000000000000000000000000000000000000	64	28	77 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 5	54	45.85.85 88.85 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86
	30	16	16	977889	20	7	20 16 0	929	78728
DATES	- May	- May	- June	May June June June June June June	- June	- June	- June - June - June	- June	May May June June June
	May 6	May 9	May 30	May 9 May 16 May 16 May 16 May 16 May 23	May 2	May 16	May 9 May 16 May 23	May 6 May 23	May 9 May 16 May 16 May 16 May 16
v)				ಶರ ಶಶ		Z			
CLASS	Inland	Ocean	Ocean	Inland Inland Ocean Inland Inland Inland	Inland	, (0)	Ocean Ocean Ocean	Ocean	
AGENT	Beaconsfield Steamship	B. & K. Shipping	Canadian Pacific Steamship	Canada Steamship Lines " " " " "	Cie Nav. Voy.	Clarke Steamship	Colley M/S	Cunard	Dept. Of Transport
VESSEL	Sir Thomas Shaughnessy	Bannercliffe	Eudora	French River Whitefish Bay Finnkraft Collingwood Iroquois Hagarty	La Madelon II	North Voyageur	Fundador Constantia Paget Trader	Laurentia Lismoria	C.C.G.S. Raven C.C.G.S. Ville Marie C.C.G.S. Eider C.C.G.S. McLean C.C.G.S. Montcalm

DATES	- June 16 31 - June 16 31	- May 30 7	May 16 7 June 20 35 June 16 31 June 16 17	- May 30 14 - June 20 28 - June 20 23 - June 16 24	- June 16 33	June 16 31	- June 20 21	- June 13 14	May 16 7 7 7 7 7 9 16 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
	May 16	May 23	May 9 May 16 May 16 May 16 May 20 May 30 May 30 May 30	May 16 May 23 May 23 May 23	May 9	May 16 May 23	May 30	May 50	May 9 May 9 May 9 May 9 May 16
CLASS	Ocean P	Ocean N	Ocean Nocean Ocean Nocean Noce	Inland NOcean Inland Inland Inland Inland	Ocean	Inland l	Ocean	Ocean	Ocean Ocean Ocean Ocean
	Federal Commerce & Mavigation Ltd.	Federal Shipping	Furness Withy	Hall Corporation	Hurum Shipping	Imperial Oil	Nerr Steanship	ienz Lines	
VESSEL	Visund Patignies	Snealand I	Halifax City Canopic Manchester Mariner Elizabeth Berger Manchester Freighter Manchester Merchant	Eastcliife Hall Michigan Maplecliife Hall Manitoba	Augustin Paulin	Imperial Verdun Imperial Lachine	Silver Beach	City of Canberra	Falkenstein Olyanogorsk Vybor les Dimitrovo Bariloone

DATA	22222424	はなったのと	~ 20 10 M M W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W	54 74 55	0 mm	7 7 4	t
	322222	22828	999999	17. 09.	0 66	10 10	50
DATEN	16 - June 16 - June 16 - June 16 - June 23 - June 23 - June 25 - June 25 - June 25 - June	9 - June 2 - June 9 - May 16 - June 13 - June	9 - May 9 - June 9 - June 16 - June 23 - June 16 - June	16 - June 23 - June 23 - June	16 - June 16 - June 16 - June	9 - June	25 - Jane
	Hay May May May May May May	May May May May June	May Nay May May May	мау Мау Мау	May May May	Hay	E. S.
CLASS	Ocean Ocean Ocean Ocean Ocean Ocean Ocean	Ocean Ocean Ocean Ocean	Ocean Ocean Ocean Ocean Ocean	Inland Inland Inland	Ocean Inland Ocean	Ocean Ocean	Ocean
भेंदिन हैं।	in shipping	NicLean Kennedy " " " " " " " "	Montreal Shipping	Papachristiais Co. N.M. Paterson & Sons	Protos Shipping R.H. Read & Co.	Saguenay Shipping Ltl.	Scandia Shipping
بالزيزين	Devorah Jarabella Transoceanica Francesca Kanev Trattengori Musa Jalil Dagan Rheinstahl	City of Perth Alkyone Rathin Head Surrey Head Marengo	Jaladhanya Ocean Star Thuredreton Monchique Ercta La Charca	Hami Honian Portadoc Saskadoc	Baltijsk Algocen Grovedale	Istina Sunleaf	Pholegandros

	A COLOR AND CONTROL OF THE CONTROL O	CLASS	of their developments and to make make their deference defer-	DATES	Continued by Egyptic by Lands (1900)	DAYS
George N. Carl G.A. Bennett Royalton	Scott Meisner "	Inland Inland Inland	Flay May	16 - June 23 - June 23 - June	999	15 to 20
Island Mariner Irish Oak	Shipping Ltd.	Ocean	May	9 - May 16 - June	10 10	27
Elat Amorgos Santa Alicia	Sutcliffe	Ocean Ocean Ocean	May May	9 - June 16 - June 23 - June	929	277
Transbay Transtream	Transit Tankers	Inland Inland	May	9 - June 2 - June	20	44
Orient Importer	Transworld Shipping	Ocean	May	16 - June	9	7

Another "small problem" which may increase the overall cost to certain owners and operators is the fact that they may be forced to teams vessels to fulfil their lift dates at other ports. For instance a given operator or owner will draw up a schedule of employment for each of his vessels two or three months in advance and bid on shipping contracts. Approximately two weeks prior to the lift date the company must nominate the actual ship to make the lift. (There is usually an allowance in the lift date called way-days to allow for inclement weather etc.) If you miss your lift date you may be cancelled and another firm may take over your contract or negotiate another one at a better rate. In fact the shipper may cancel you and then renegotiate with you at a lower rate. If one is to avoid losing the cargo and possibly a client in the future, the shipowner or operator may deem it expedient to charter a vessel so as to protect against losing the cargo. Again depending on the size, age, and type of vessel required the costs will vary. However, the cost also varies with the demand for vessels. It is well known that the market was tight during the latter part of May, and June and some of July. Estimates on the hiring of a vessel ranged from \$2,000 to \$3,500 per day. assume that the average cost would have been \$2500 per day, and that the average vessel would have been leased for twenty eight days or one round trip. Further let us assume that the owners and/or operators were forced to lease 20% of the eighty four vessels stuck in Montreal. Such being the case it means that the strike would have cost the owners and operators \$1,176,000 bringing the total to \$6,928,500.

It must be pointed out that these figures are only estimates

and therefore are subject to suspect.

It should be further noted that while the strike is costing some owners a lot of money others are reaping in large profits from for instance leasing arrangements. Also certain other parties may be benefiting such as the Montreal retailers, restaurants, fuel suppliers etc, from having this number of men in port. Such a benefit to the community is impossible to determine. However, it is felt that while the strike benefits some, it retards the growth and profits of far more.

Let us now turn to the cost to the agents. The agents are paid a flat fee for entering and clearing a ship from the harbour varying upon its size and class from \$250 to \$375. Further most agents receive about 5% of the charge for cargo exported and 2.5% of the charge for cargo imported. Thus if the average vessel cost \$325 to enter and clean, the strike cost the agents approximately \$28,275 since there were 87 fewer ships in port than in the previous year. I have assumed there would have been approximately as many as there were in 1965 had there not been a strike.

In viewing Table V-7-b it is obvious that a great deal of overtime must have been worked in June in Montreal. It is also obvious that the agents suffered most during the month of May. It is not possible to estimate in dollars the effect of the strike. However, it should be noted that the overall cargo handled in Montreal in 1966 was greater than in the previous year. Thus one is led to conclude that the commissions for agents increased although not as much as they might have

OROTTO

TOTAL CARGO PASSING THROUGH TERMINALS

1962 - 1966

(SHORT TONS)

1966 ** PROJECTION	148,442	56,631	75,155	72,185	52,124	74,111	70,131	417,79	19,773	550,585	
TREND **	的 (20) (2) (4) (4)	+	+ 13,382	+ 11,791	4 4.00	+ 16,923	(n)	+ 6,426	+ 10,558	4	
1966	45,078	61,117	84,357	909'99	53,724	86,468	70,221	102,708	27,566	600,875	
1965	49,020	58,982	95,113	90,945	55,475	91,839	77,799	98,349	12,226	629,748	
1961	32,453	59,202	45,465	55,422	46,702	55,229	59,480	97,758	13,752	i465,463	
1963	19,353	43,644	51,549	39,629	46,033	40,613	55,876	89,972	1,668	388,347	
1962	N.A.	948,14	54,968	55,572	41,037	41,070	49,085	79,070	N.A.	362,648	
MONTH	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	10 to	

* Cource: Toronto Harbour Commissioners. Mr. D.C. Weir, Comptroller.
** Calculations By author: Projection = 4 years average (1962 = 1965). + trend.
Note: Ilgures prior to 1962 not available. T.H.C. took over operation of terminals in 1962.

Port is only operational for nine months due to climatic conditions. Also:

TABLE V - 7 - b

MONTREAL

CARGO OVER MATIONAL HARBOUR BOARD PIERS .

1961 - 1966

(SHORT TONS)

MONTH	TYPE	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	TREND **	FROS DON
January	Ocean Going Domestic	0	0	3,704	11,638 0	21,370 16,643	10h,771 4,140		9,034
February	Ocean Going Domestic	7,240	14,270	5,600 44,489	10,591 59,557	36,194 113,884	69,472 118,994	÷ 7,648	18,125
March	Ocean Going Domestic	1,338 35,525	24,941 73,317	30,163 59,025	31,538 137,486	132,088 174,634	144,328 194,680	+ 32,687	76,701
April.	Ocean Going Domestic	769,496 647,837	728,00 8 477,085	681,529 616,896	90 3, 398 914,338	1,027,382 713,039	1,031,561 995,040	4 64,471	886,434
May	Ocean Going Domestic	1,694,582 1,176,386	1,242,377 1,145,537	1,289,533	1,541,851 1,263,673	1,559,366 1,238,671	68 5, 951 896,934	-33,765 +15,571	1,431,777 1,218,071
June	Ocean Going Domestic	1,668,885 1,206,194	1,429,292	1,234,231	1,540,992	1,171,545 863,219	1,137,213	-124,335 -85,744	1,284,654 1,072,295
July	Ocean Going Domestic	1,384,834 1,173,413	2,011,366 1,088,587	1,670,910 1,007,564	1,967,113	1,015,966 678,466	2,829,207 1,685,533	-92,217	1,517.821
August	Ocean Going Domestic	1,756,128 1,142,044	1,955,816 1,087,092	1 ,3 99 , 58 7 855 , 300	1,387,408 1,045,448	1,544,513	1,532,130 1,465,218	52,904	1,555,786
September	Ocean Going Domestic	1,373,986 1,163,957	1,443,719 886,152	1,767,748 1,125, 75 0	1,812,629 1,013,682	2,034,139 1,201,384	1,191,741 1,074,396	-357,906	1,328,538
October	Ocean Going Domestic	1,290,815	1,455,655 1,178,419	1,375,984 1,045,852	1,275,533	2,063,471 1,134,556	1,507,390 1,173,609	+193,164	1,685,456
November	Ocean Going Domestic	1,504,969 1,295,207	1,036,351 1,254,188	1,985,169 1,583,631	1,546,442 967,395	1,875,519 1,151,530	1,704,460	+89,742	1,679,432
December	Ocean Going Domestic	338,090 382,411	282,490 361,947	697,185 655,019	632,901 358, 5 27	838,309 612,255	748,919 618,015	+125,055 + 57,461	682,850
Sub total	Ocean Going Domestic	11,783,123 9,3 59,038	11,610,015 8,585,295	12, 137,639 9,276,527	12,662,034 9,364,490	13,319,862	12,676,143 10,538,426	+384,185	12,687,719 9,023,329
	Total	21,142,161	20,195,310	21,414,166	22,026,524	22, 311,014	23,214,569	+292,213	21,710,048

[•] Source: National Harbours Board, Mr. Guy Beaudet, Por: Manager, Montreal.

^{••} Calculations By author: Projection = 5 years average (1961 - 1965) # trend.

TABLE V - 7 - c

HALIFAX HARDOUR

TOTAL CARGO OVER N.H.B. PIERS 1959 - 1966 .

(SHORT TONS)

		1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	TREND	1966 •• PROJECTION
Ocean Going Domestic	January	238,783 11,411									239,813
Ocean Going Domestic	February	242,941 13,960									273,912
Ocean Going Domestic	March	23 1,956 19,934						385,807 13,667			308,974
Ocean Going Domestic	April	108,88 8 2 3,10 9			100,531 20,934			108,196 20,692			99,241
Ocean Going Domestic	Hay	64,376 24,233	63,201 34,8 32	42,992 42,157	62,745 26,379	30,603 51,625	142,695 58,432	42,907 49,837	67,263 27,192		60,639
Ocean Going Domestic	June	41,218 21,995	35,874 39,230	29,045 49,173	34,891 41,103	35,474 23,401	21,052 36,235	38,479 48,271	98,745 34,825		33,262
Ocean Going Domestic	July	36,620 33,620	26,782 55,394	48,082 45,532	43,558 70,528	20,814 55,87 6	31,802 45,292	52,658 54,978	62,951 43,112		39,861
Ocean Going Domestic	August	37,486 17,540	40,009 34,727	53,373 39,833	34,496 60,846	43,035 32,181	22,754 64,255	38,22 5 39,245	51,084 31,228		38,605
Ocean Going Domestic	September	39,383 34,260	21,602 19,782	28,379 40,443	41,383 16,889	22,818 41,485	3 9,126 51, 485	6 3,36 5 3 7,333	24,688 51,866	+ 3,997	40,576
Ocean Going Domestic	October	33,501 18,276	41,424 38,878	30,168 54,725	31,056 29,541	123,382 60,559	41,064 48,613	49,320 60, 412	33,272 11,521	+ 2,636	52,624
Ocean Going Domestic	November	47,380 54,030	41,920 20,396	54,911 24,531	34,204 18,791	77,926 81,282	38,983 33,371	53,399 29,411	38,077 47,940	+ 1,003	50,820
Ocean Going Domestic	December	128,291 14,439	133,229 23,564	177,952 17,930	163,539 33,560	175,676 26,796	193,318 5,450	203,417	168,329 6,763	12,521	180,438
Sub-Yearly To	tal										
Ocean Going Domestic		1,250,823 286,796	1,176,566 310,963	1,348,776 358,944	1,244,140 366,286	1,315,889 440,601	1,568,697 413,700	1,612,142	1,555,004 305,491	60,220	1,416,940
Total		1,537,619	1,487,529	1,707,720	1,610,426	1,756,490	1,982,397	1,993,153	1,860,495	+368,670	2 ,093,7 18

^{*} Source: Netional Harbours Board, Mr. J.R. Hitchell, Port Manager, Halifax,

^{**} Calculations By author: Projection = 7 years average (1959 - 1965) + trend

- 168 -

had there been no strike, while their fees for entering and clearing ships declined in proportion to the decrease in the number of vessels frequenting the port.

It is also interesting to note that the total cargo passing through both Toronto and Halifax decreased in 1966 from the previous year's level. There are two possible conclusions which may be drawn from this fact. The first is that Toronto and Halifax would have suffered a great deal more had there not been a diversion and/or rerouting of cargo from Montreal. The second conclusion one might draw is that the cargo diverted and rerouted out of Montreal did not go to or come from Toronto or Halifax, but from the U.S.

I feel to a certain extent that both conclusions are justified. Some cargoes probably went through Toronto and Halifax while others passed through U.S. ports such as New York, Port Elizabeth and Boston.

A study was made of the volume of a number of selected cargoes which normally pass through the three ports in any given year.

It is interesting to note from Tables V-8-a,b and c the following points:

- 1. The volume of sugar (raw and refined) being unloaded in Montreal decreased considerably but it also decreased in Toronto and did not increase appreciably in Halifax.
- 2. The volume of bituminous coal unloaded in Montreal decreased somewhat but it decreased considerably more in Toronto without

TABLE V - 8 - a

TURONTO .

VOLUME OF SELECTED ** INTERNATIONAL CARGOES

1959 - 1966

(SHORT TONS)

UNLOADING	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	1961	1962	1963	1964	<u>1965</u>	1966	1966 FROJECTION	TREND
Corn Raw Sugar Molasses Crude Soya Beans Bituminous Coal Salt Fuel oil Lubricating Oil and Grease General Cargo	11,749 97,722 14,267 285,611 1,209,652 N. A. 217,744 N. A.	24,262 37,034 17,463 350,581 1,157,515 R.A. N.A.	17,930 104,607 31,488 250,186 1,099,203 12,000 62,357 38,561	33,485 132,082 21,848 336,165 1,692,465 38,929 109,573 42,002	36,223 72,228 22,331 352,876 2,734,881 23,666 127,256 40,275 226,688	23,128 94,898 28,515 399,542 2,084,456 36,682 118,606 44,468	21,403 125,487 25,800 302,914 2,396,528 32,898 283,438 40,410	17,678 121,650 17,175 309,325 1,770,145 70,938 224,245 61,608 327,649	25,635 116,232 25,024 328,295 1,965,623 27,315 208,432 41,605	+ 1,609 + 3,988 + 1,972 + 2,884 + 197,813 - 1,508 + 55,270 + 21,167
LOADING										
General Cargo	85,429	106,568	75,131	80,496	74,406	106,595	N.A.	87,391	92,337	+ 4,223

^{*} SQUAGE: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Shipping Reports, Part II, Table 6. 0.8.5. 54-203

 $^{^{\}rm ev}$ Cargoes Selected were those consistently over 10,000 tons per year.

MALE: N.A. = Not Announced.
Trend and Projection calculated By Author

TAILE V-8-b

MONTREAL*

VOLUME OF STRECTED**INTERNATIONAL CARGOES 1959 - 1966 (Short Tone)

					(Short Tone)					
Un-	Product	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	Trend	Pro- jection
loaded	Wheat Corn Dried Fruits Sugar, Raw & Refined Soya Beans Manganese Ore Other Met, Ores Coal: Bituminous Crude Petroleum	133,875 338,334 14,256 294,016 87,602 21,069 10,602 571,985 1,602,551	128,594 240,140 12,172 274,167 112,369 N/A 26,086 149,206 2,474,393	274,198 194,887 10,177 315,743 109,316 20,049 20,301 441,909 2,931,635	173,49h 322,295 13,097 320,577 150,034 36,342 22,523 416,885 3,546,347	114,300 500,533 17,190 319,405 125,351 44,292 12,544 398,708 2,472,300	75,575 451,862 12,583 304,493 203,364 32,838 30,567 372,159 1,461,280	95,308 334,907 N/A 380,302 49,564 87,141 13,226 430,338 2,174,413	79,094 559,691 10,960 334,231 80,654 46,549 20,451 395,039 811,225	-6,428 -571 -335 +14,381 -6,340 +13,214 +444 -20,274 +95,310	135,735 339,852 12,909 2,207,384 113,317 53,503 19,581 417,039 2,475,727
	Textile & Sacking Fabrics Chemicals & Chemical	37,140	52,224	35,470	43,117	34,883	41,323	46,160	39,068	+1,503	42,977
	Products Petroleum Oils Molasses, Crude Fertilizers Autos, Truck Parts General	57,883 668,773 N/A N/A N/A 945,844	28,963 772,368 77,690 20,628 N/A 772,688	29,767 805,112 61,197 N/A 41,300 851,610	32,882 906,125 66,826 25,327 22,277 794,007	21,326 961,136 96,240 25,969 10,400 817,847	17,098 1,474,739 80,026 34,615 15,829 906,845	14,528 2,144,661 85,083 34,492 18,900 942,989	46,912 2,198,631 110,844 22,655 14,757 293,271	-7,226 +245,981 +1,479 +3,466 +5,600 -8,809	21,695 1,350,683 79,322 31,672 16,141 852,881
Loaded											
	Wheat Corn learley Flour Grain Flouxeed Soys Beens Anbestos Iron & Steel Scrap fumber & Timber Woodprip Antmat Oils & Fats Other Cruie Non-Met. Nickel Burs Unelloyed Copper,	1,310,187 233,521 113,467 130,511 105,673 103,900 32,782 62,316 10,371 14,457 10,266 Min. N/A 51,324	1,hh1,5h6 134,292 76,305 150,845 89,123 154,980 32,825 76,199 18,621 28,615 10,220 27,411 41,595	2,142,5h0 36,709 N/A 135,228 66,581 142,h85 28,438 180,708 18,207 23,861 10,731 30,037 29,912	1,351,909 125,266 80,993 124,680 132,883 154,241 24,525 55,370 15,084 21,304 21,304 21,300 35,873	2,448,336 279,411 61,574 140,569 84,838 190,592 13,450 75,259 N/A 27,003 21,280 33,032 28,452	2,795,166 310,960 31,964 125,067 93,749 226,801 25,363 106,035 12,320 30,015 28,089 21,814 36,106	2,429,691 226,379 49,666 189,888 34,825 115,432 37,570 29,047 15,892 15,053 34,419 45,846 N/A	3,407,729 98,714 141,709 235,585 38,530 82,446 172,326 33,272 33,323 36,062 30,580 49,078 11,132	+305,035 -1,190 -12,760 +9,896 -11,808 +1,922 +798 -5,745 +704 +999 +4,032 +3,687 +956	1,495,220 191,170 56,561 152,304 75,002 157,687 28,648 77,748 15,453 23,000 23,131 3,227 34,833
	Brass, Pronze Petroleum Oils Zinc Bar General	24,691 50,703 N/A 1,004,894	82,365 N/A 13,348 890,876	59,925 44,034 N/A 833,185	56,895 32,820 13,077 783,914	40,978 34,614 11,934 917,603	54,279 27,867 17,101 1,095,604	49,886 82,401 19,865 1,109,703	58,895 62,296 34,081 148,029	+4,199 +6,340 +1,629 +17,468	56,915 51,746 16,694 965,437

^{*}Gource: Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Shipping Reports, Part II, Table 6. DBS 54-203. **Cargoes selected were those consistently over 10,000 tons per year. Note: \mathbb{N}/\mathbb{A} = Not Announced.

Trend and Projection Calculated by Author.

VOLUME OF STEATS ** INTERNATIONAL CARGOES

TLYTED ** INTERNA 1956 - 1966 (SHORT TONS)

TREAD	2,975 4,23,423 4,23,423 1,43,1 1,43,1 22,226	22,22 21,060 1,060
1966 PROJECTION	4 4 4 4 4 1	40 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 6
1966	22,853 N°.4,158 758,454 N°.8,158 23,302	626,057,1 626,05
1965	3,005,657 12,058 668,325 668,325 24,192 48,456	462,831 126,107 14,146 29,951 1,741,820 14,499 35,217 356,455
1967	7,112,215 12,123 12,123 12,227 22,277 48,456	555,933 127,613 13,164 N.A. 1,674,430 48,302 12,201 273,835
1963	16,736 2,917,466 14,518 243,946 16,802 62,980	428,185 55,173 55,173 16,130 1,470,673 57,323 10,353
2957	2,537,934 11,589 479,641 20,066 64,619	305,907 105,114 10,255 20,893 1,746,206 29,698 N.A.
1961	2, 42, 62, 73, 73, 74, 76, 74, 76, 74, 76, 74, 76, 74, 76, 74, 76, 74, 76, 76, 76, 76, 76, 76, 76, 76, 76, 76	436, 281 83, 472 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10,
1960	2,671,679 14,560 309,625 22,724 58,529	266,996 71,842 79,388 1,762,347 26,937 23,178
1959	2,35,700 10,460 346,578 15,607 15,607	536,458 63,827 1,739,937 59,580 59,580
PRODUCT	Rubber Cruse Perroleum Salt Pet. Oils Autos, Trucks, Parts General Cargo	Wheat Wheat Flour Apples Nickel Copper Ore Gypsum Lumber & Timber Fuel Oil General Cargo

* SOURCE: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Shipping Reports, Part II, table 6.

Cargom Selected were those consistently over 10,000 tons per year.

NOTE: N.A. * Not Announced. Trend and Projection calculated By Author.

increasing noticeably in Halifax.

- 3. The volume of general cargo unloaded in Montreal was substantially reduced, but it likewise decreased in Halifax while showing only a slight increase in Toronto.
- 4. The volume of wheat unloaded in Montreal decreased a small amount but did not increase appreciably in Toronto or Halifax.
- Perhaps the most significant point is that crude petroleum unloaded in Montreal decreased by 1,363,000 short tons while Halifax showed an increase of 104,000 short tons unloaded. It would be interesting, but unfortunately not possible, to see whether any or what proportion of that increase was transshipped to Montreal from Toronto, Halifax or possibly Portland, Maine.

On the loading side of the tables, the following items should be noted:

- 1. General cargo loaded in Montreal decreased by 961,000 short tons from the previous year's level. However, the tonnage loaded in Halifax of this type of cargo also decreased by about 318,000 short tons and there was no discernable increase in the Toronto loading figures.
- 2. It is interesting to note also that the volume of wheat loaded in Montreal increased despite the strike and that it decreased in Halifax.
- 3. It may be significant to note that Halifax loaded an all time high volume of nickel and copper ore, increasing its 1965 total by

17,000 short tons.

In summary one might expect commodities such as sugar, bituminous coal, crude petroleum and general cargo to have entered not only
the Montreal area but the country via the U.S. by either road and/or rail
transport.

It appears that the exports or loadings most affected by the strike were nickel and copper, wheat and other grains possibly and general cargo.

Table V-9-a indicates that the value in Canadian dollars of total exports by sea to Latin American countries over the years 1954-1966 increased by only 0.52%. Table V-9-b however shows that leakage to these countries via the U.S. in the same period has increased by 108.06%.

It is important for a shipping company, however, to know more than the value of the cargo. It must know the deadweight tonnage in order to be able to convert this into the number of vessels that would be required to carry the cargo. Such a study has been carried out and the results are presented in Tables V-10-a and b. It must be pointed out that these figures are at best estimates since one had to convert the dollar value for each commodity into long tons. Using the 1965 D.B.S. figures, it was calculated that the \$34,636,000 of leakage was equal to approximately 253,881 long tons which would fill approximately 25 average size vessels. Thus it can be estimated that in 1964, 182,473 long tons or 18 vessels worth of cargo leaked through the U.S. and this grew to

Table V - 9-a

VALUE IN CAHADIAN DOLLARS OF TOTAL EXPORTS* BY SEA, 1964, 1965, 1966

COUNTRIES OF DESTINATION	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	1966
Venezucla	\$40,323,000	\$46,553,000	\$35,741,000
Jamaica	26,579,000	27,536,000	30,281,000
Trinided	17,033,000	20,315,000	21,520,000
Calinnas	5,735,000	5,206,000	5,504,000
Bermuda	5,026,000	4,544,000	4,779,000
Barbados	6,329,000	6,185,000	7,532,000
D. Republic	7,876,000	5,414,000	5,987,000
Guiana	,747,070	7,400,000	To (James of Charles)
Lee./Wind. Is.	7,371,000	7,326,000	7,687,000
Puerto Rico	12,459,000	16,013,000	16,117,000
	\$143,478,000	\$145,498,000	\$144,231,000
	100.00%	102.10%	100.523

* Source: DBS: -65 - 206.

NOTE: ALL CAHADIAN POLLARS

Table V - 9-b

VALUE IN CANADIAN DOLLARS OF TOTAL ROAD/RAIL* "LEFKAGE" THROUGH U.S. PORTS, 1974, 1995, 1960

COUNTRIES OF DESTINATION	<u> 1964</u> .	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>
Venezuela	\$15,619,000	\$26,569,000	\$39,566,000
Jamaica	1,521,000	1,326,000	1,784,000
Trinidad	223,000	353,000	o20 ,000
Bahamas	2,655,000	3,273,000	4,344,000
Bernada	225,000	248,000	463,000
Barbados	99,000	21+1+,000	108,000
D. Republic	1,160,000	69 0, 000	793,000
Guiana	265,000	77,000	211,000
loc/Wind. Is.	197,000	207,000	606,000
Puerto Rico	2,929,000	1,649,000	3,291,000
	\$24,893,000	\$34,636,000	\$51,792,000
	and the state of t		
	100.00%	139.14%	208.06%

* Source: DBS: - 65 - 206.

MOTE: ALL CANADIAN DOLLARS

379,651 long tons or 37 vessels in 1966. It appears from Tables V-10-a and b that about 62% of the 1965 leakage left the country by rail and most of the total from Ontario.

One should recognize that some leakage is inevitable particularly with the winter freeze-up. However, the rate at which it is increasing
should, I feel, give cause for alarm. It is interesting to note that of
this 108.06% increase that 68.92% of it took place in 1966. One cannot
help wondering what effect the St. Lawrence River Longshoremen's strike
might have had on this trend.

One might well ask why the increase is growing so fast. Is it due to factors of service, economy or both? Although one cannot be sure, I would suggest that it is due partially to both, but that the extraordinary increase in 1966 was due to economic factors or at least potential ones.

What really disturbs me are the long term implications of this trend. If the trend increases it means that there will be a loss of at least a reduction in the growth potential of the Canadian economy. For instance freight charges will be paid in U.S. dollars, resulting in a loss through exchange on currency; our port agents will lose their commission on this freight; U.S. agents will gain the commission; our long-shore labour force will have that much less work while men holding similar jobs in the U.S. will have that much more; the U.S. port and terminal operators will increase their income through the handling of the ships required to handle these cargoes and through the storing and warehousing

TABLE V - 10 - 4

DEADWEIGHT ANALYSIS BY REGIOUS OF PRODUCTION OF CANADIAN DEMESTIC GOODS EXPORTED INTO THE U.S. BY ROAD. ALSO, U.S. CONSUMPTION TOTAL AND "LEAKAGE" •

ROAD U.S. CONSUMPTION DEADWEIGHT BY REGIONS IN LONG TONS TOTAL COMMODITY LEAKAGU DRITISH COLUMBIA TOTAL . ONTARLO PRAIRIES L/TONS ATLANTIC التالينالي 252,86) 1,310 180,023 20,728 254, 179 ,773 13,113 37,542 Cattle 1,164 1,164 1,097 45 .20 Sheep 898 398 698 108 64 Swine 985 979 21 88 74 554 198 Horses 2,073 86 1.845 54 2,159 138 122 Poultry 99 234 234 15 12 107 Fur Animals 1,388 26 7 1.465 1.465 Other live animals 9 35 1,122 56.040 54.918 1.747 667 15,920 24,557 13,149 Meat, F.C.F. 3,707 3,047 660 365 503 Meat, C. 9 1.091 1,779 174 147 172 1,770 1,248 522 Meat, R.C.N.C. 1.277 1,118 22 32 1,175 1.141 34 Mest, M.P.C. 20,234 924 20.234 Fish, W.D.F. 5,232 1,446 6,443 6.189 9,771 9,698 73 2.044 2,719 198 2,555 Fish, W.D.F. 2,255 Fish, F.F.C. 18 5,664 5,664 479 3,654 95 1.418 1,474 1,833 2,693 626 20,861 20,846 15 Fish, F.F. 14,235 16,715 Fish, B.F.S.F. 12,103 2,812 155 1,014 649 16,733 17 532 21 348 41 553 Fish, 8.8.8. 106 7 51 965 965 471 428 65 1 Flah. S.D. 83 46 208 337 337 Fish, P. 7 144 60 84 Fish, G. 126 1 10 9,918 9,918 8.872 41 121 5 879 Shellfish 548 527 21 Other F.F.F. 1 17 433 97 4,599 5,391 968 4.423 Dairy Produce 792 665 339 Eggs 4 627 16 357 1,004 52 52 Honey 1 - 1 50 4,885 16,485 26,715 26,715 Cereals, U. 177 3,937 1,231 Coreals, M. 386 411 205 402 1,404 833 571 Bakery Products 452 2,227 7,617 213 935 11,444 11,392 52 1,794 Macaroni. 1,879 85 153 1,711 3 12 Other cereals 149 48 80 87 367 367 - 3 Fruits, Berries, F.C. 24,548 22,970 1,578 1,737 2,067 11,308 75 9,361 Fruite, Berries, F. 703 709 164 423 1,999 1,999 Fruit Juices, C. 43 11 102 35 196 194 Fruit D.P.N.C. 114 80 114 33 1 Fruit, P.C. 880 489 880 1 20 370 Nuts, not oil nuts 11 44 55 144 11 Vegetables, F.C. 10,006 15,315 61,268 2,908 798 88,295 88,074 221 Vegetables, F. 518 217 310 89 327 9 735 Vegetables, D.P.N.C. 35 275 275 173 3 64 Vegetables V.J.C. 16 43 66 62 Pickles, S.D. 7 92 24 21 144 149 3 Sugar M.S. 3,018 4.583 232 1,177 9 147 4.432 151 Sugar P.&C. 2 714 3,589 2.677 3 3,611 215 22 Cocoa chocolate 38 2 hO 40 Coffee 8 25 33 Spices, S.H.S.S. 2 17 23 22

ROAD (Continued)

COMMODITY	DEADWEIGHT	BY REGION	IS IN LONG	TONS			U.S. CONSUMPTION TOTAL	
	ATLANTIC	QUEBEC	ONTARIO	PRAIRIES	BRITISH COLUMBIA	TOTAL		LEAKAGE L/TONS
			May (C) (Market proper Libbs					
Vinegar	-	-	112	-	-	112	112	-
Margarine, S.L.	-	-	3	-	2	3	5	7
Soups, not infant 8.	-	1	8	-	15	511	22	5.
Infant Foods	-	-	147	-	-	147	-	147
Frozen Food, P.C.P.	78	14	335	2	42	471	464	7
Food Mats. P.	5	782	1,067	753	122	2,730	2,665	65
Other Food P.	3	48	166	1	5	223	188	35
Hay, forage, straw	6,760	94,729	13,028	1,734	137	116,388	116,388	-
Cercals, G. & B.F.	-	2,397	1,051	181	6,229	4,858	9,858	
Oil seed cake, meal	-	181	19	-	-	500	200	-
Feeds of Veg. origin	5	7,885	830	-	1,332	10,049	9,887	162
Feeds an. origin	20	7)	53	247	8,82?	9,242	9,242	44
Feeds & C.	-	11,275	4,324	167	27	15,793	15,793	-
Non-alcoholic Bevs.	-	6	?	-	37	45	45	-
Ferm.al. beva.	50	2,385	11,12%	1	68	13,632	13,625	7
Dist. sl. hevs.		8,676	21,281	2,993	1,450	34,330	32,993	1,337
Applicated July	-	- }	337	-	-	337	4	333
Tobacco, men.		24	18	_	-	45	35	7
Hides & rkine	140	2,219	1,563	180	22	4,124	3,350	774
Pur skips	12	2,063	170	7	278	2,530	2,311	219
Lantage	~	20	8,494	182	10	8,715	8,715	
menthers. Q. & B.	-	5	10	16	3	54	34	
An. mate, in druge	-	47	152	Žģ.	50	253	231	22
An. mats. orune	-	5,300	314		-	5,614	5,614	~
Speds, sowing	7		728	7,843	380	8,958	8,875	83
Oil seeds, nuts kernals	~	- 1	1,631	5,583	117	7,331	7,522	3
Nurse green, stock .	52	140	855	4	256	1,302	1,305	1
Medical herbs	-	29	19	~		48	47	1
Natural subber, gum								-
Nat. gumn % resins	1	14	Ŀ,	-	-	19	17	2
Crude Veg. mats. in	1,234	31,631	15,702	3,309	36,556	88,432	88,415	17
logs, round & square	1,409	1,046	786	5	9	3,255	3,255	-
Bolts, wooden	5,482	1,374	183	~	32	7,076	7,076	-
Round timber	18	1,177	5,464	431	413	7,503	7,503	_
Pulipwood	308,336	126,026	9,876	4,562	7,332	456,132	456,132	~
Wood mate, crude	13,213	9,360	7,947	160	2,373	33,053	33,053	~
Wool, animal bair	- 1	746	461	11	5	1,223	1,212	11
Animal hair fibre	- 1	38	-	11 .	-	49	43	_
Cotton		245	145	7	-	397	397	-
Veg. tex. fibre:	-	102	101	184	-	387	387	_
Synthetic fibres	-	723	1,904	1	3	2,631	21. 444	387
Iron Ore. con. scrap	1	3,837	44,038	198	207	48,281	48,281	
Aluminum ores serep	33	1,940	5,772		36"	8,112	8,096	16
Copper ore contactap		1,438	1,388	?	75	2,908	2,899	9
tolk a or o out, who				,		L 1 700	2,077	7

ROAD (continued)

COMMODITY	DEADWEIGHT	BY REGION	S IN LONG	TONS			U.S. CONSUMPTION TOTAL	
	ATLANTIC	QUEHEC	ONTARIO	PRAIRIES	BRITISH COLUMBIA	TOTAL		LEAKAG: L/TON:
Lead ore, con. scrap	13	38	465	556	3,124	4, 196	4,196	
Nickel ore, con. scrap		95	16,476	,	3	16,574	16,451	127
Prec.metals in O.C.S.		3	13		6	22	22	123
Zinc ores, C. & S.	_	69	967	26	8,317	9,379	9,379	1.
Other met. ores. C. & S.	1	947	433		118	1,499	1,499	
Coal	112,225	143	-	359	88	112,815	112,815	_
Crude bit. subs.	_	-	147	7,027	-	7,174	7,174	
Asbestos, unman.	_	20,879	1,285	16	25	22,206	21,696	E40
Clay & other ref. mat.	_	2	55	18	-			510
Abrasives	_				81	75 81	75 81	-
Sand & gravel	6,229	4,808	6,735	34,796	186	1	1	-
Stone, crude	55	14,059	3,872	2,445	17,317	52,754	52,754	-
Crude non-met. mats	215	1,045	3,375	75	1	37,748	37,748	
Waste & scrap mate	1,178	21,014	11,965	899	115	4,825	4.795	30
Leather & L. Fab mat.	1	149	7,980	73	117	46,227	46,227	-
Fur dressed & Feb.		219	202	2	9	8,320 432	7,151	1169
Rubber fab mats.	_	69	495	1	38		398	34
camler	60,454	110,032	130,382	2,697		602	528	74
Railway ties		-	-		96,741	400,306	400,149	157
Sawmill Products	5,500	18,060	1,940	80	825	830	830	-
Veneer plywood, etc.	. 45	9,560	8,665	30	5,250	30,830	30,830	-
Millwork	35	2,055	525	10	- 40	18,340	18,340	-
Other wood mats.	490	4,610	7,120		265	2,890	2,875	15
Wood pulps	447	6,988	1	70	2,555	14,845	14,845	-
Printing paper	449	148,069	17,078	1	74	24,731	24,731	-
Fine paper	-	1,510	144,938	890	1,029	295,375	292,611	2,764
Tissue & san. paper			78 88	2	-	1,590	1,534	56
Wrapping paper		25	1	-	3	116	101	15
Spec. in. & coat. paper		357 114	764	5	1	1,127	1,127	-
Paper board	3		68	-	-	182	154	28
Building paper board	21	3,769 1,844	2,424	5	25	6,226	6,225	1
Wet machine board	-	425	4,297	2,363	2,459	10,984	10,972	12
Converted paper		3,880	2.2	-	-	447	423	24
Yarn & thread	14	618	9,445	-	30	13,355	11,070	2,285
Cordage, twine & rope	1		1,059	-	5	1,696	1,542	154
Broad woven fabrics	22	1,034	4,462	1	35	4,526	4,509	17
Special con. fabrica	2	1	246	_	2	1,304	1,252	52
Other fabrics	-	162	48	-	1	213	93	120
Misc. Tex. Fab. mats		787	973	_		1,760	849	911
Animal oils & fats			18	-	1	37	27	10
Fish & marine oils	-	10	96	40	•	146	146	-
Veg. oils and fats		20	3	26	24	53	53	-
Oils, fat, waxes A & G.		29	74	2	1	106	106	-
Gum, wood & veg. extract	-	75	148	1 -	1	224	22.2	2
Chemical elements	-	614	327	176	42	1,159	1,150	9
o committee	-	888	8,930	17	13	9,848	9,803	45

ROAD (continued)

COMMODITY	DEADWEIGHT	BY REGIONS	IN LONG	TONS			U.S. COMSUMPTION PYFAL	
	ATLANTIC	QUEBEC	ONTARIO	PRAIRIES	BRITISH COLUMBIA	TOTAL		LEAKAGE L/Tons
In acid & ox. compounds		95	40,758	1,759	7,787	50,399	50,393	
In cases & met. oxides	942	5,049	3,742	-	559	10,292	10,290	and the state of t
Met. salts in acid		4,618	11,641	1,008	2,572	19,839	19,778	F5 1
In ors. chemicals	_	642	5,320	_	40	6,002	4,880	1,4,
Phenols, E.A. & D.	-	64	224	-	0.49	288	240	1
Organ chemiclas	2	6,275	40,107	642	366	47,392	45,923	1,000
Fertilizer & fer. mata.	4,440	22,720	82,060	11,820	46,120	167,160	167,140	.,
Insect & Rod. cides	1	38	57	18	6	120	49	19
Adhesives	39	134	33	_	8	214	2011	
Plastics & Syn. Rubber	2.	503	10,861	7	6	11,379	9,843	1,500
Plast. Paspes & forms	1	1,864	2,311	L.	38	4,218	1,337	. 911
Dyes, P.L.T.	-	32	işlş		**	76	67	
Paint & products		61	185	1	21	268	227	1, 1
Indust. cliem. & Ex.	_	369	1,430	8	13	1,820	1,654	166
Gasoline		83	2	113	23,062	23,260	23,260	-
Fuel cil	8.0	2,286	203,692	6,171	17	212, 166	212,166	-
Lub. oil & greases	-	15	3,748	52	dert	3,815	3,811	4
Core	-	414	2,268	-	~	2,682	2,682	
Petrol & coal prods	100	550	436,00	215,00	80,00	737,50	729,50	300
Ferro, alloys	_	L _b	1,462	-	19.	1,466	1,458	4
Frimary iron & steel	-	4,465	9,435	- "	2	13,902	13,902	-
Castings & forgings	5	793	68,052	33	166	69,049	61,886	7,165
Bars & rods, steel	17	3,973	11,360	8	157	15,515	15,363	1 -
Strol, P.S.S.	20	2,008	71,019	898	164	74,100	71,947	2, 162
Struct. S. & S.P.	472	2,824	1,504	3	561	5,364	5,326	53
Raila & track mats.	-	40	833		Łį.	877	868	19
from, steel, pipes tubes	7	291	4,688	4,078	2,625	11,689	10,767	1.,
lron, steel, wire rope	4	661	2,459	14	200	3,338	3,243	15
Aluminum & alloys	2	15,742	4,344	2	14143	20,539	17,887	2.
Copper & alloys	2	4,054	9,368	9	1,485	14,918	12,643	2,2 1
Lead & alloys	117	8	625	38	111	899	834	6,
Nickel & alleys	-	27	52,082	1,446	19	53.574	51,627	1,7932
Prec. met. inc. alloys	445	206	83		13	30.2	302	-
Zinc. & alloys		996	578	1	219	1,794	1,794	
Non-ferrous, M.&A.	46.	2,645	10,643	8	1.750	15,046	14,913	193
Wire fencing S. & N.	3	538	878	-	7	1,426	1,401	1.7
Abrasive products	100	30	58,645	-	-	58,679	58,675	-
Convey, ele. equip.	24	248	2,834	410	2,696	6,212	5,878	17%
Bolts, nuts & B.H.	372	4,946	12,094	46	946	18,404	18,036	, Q
Valve & Pipe fittings	8	3,036	1,942	60	20	5,066	3,894	1,172
Metal, fab. basics	2,008	27,220	22,896	$I_{k_{\infty}}I_{k}I_{l}I_{k}$	1,492	58,060	49,216	प प्रकृत
Cley bricks & tiles	78	268	856	240	962	2,464	2,374	30
Glass basic products	16	30	1,188	Įş.	6	1,244	1,224	2.1
Asbestos & as. cement	2	796	662	18	90	1,568	1,324	بابارد

ROAD (continued)

COMMODITY	DEADWEIGHT	BY REGIO	DOL NI BN	TONS			U.S. CONSUMPTION TOTAL	
	ATLANTIC	QUEBEC	ONTARIO	PRAIRIES	BRITISH COLUMBIA	TOTAL		LEAKAC L/AGNS
Cement & concrete	288	744	780	2,224	36	4,072	4,068	14
Non-met. min. prods.	6	848	2,838	22	122	3,836.	3,816	20
Mis. fab. mats.	8	1,410	3,638	392	116	5,564	4,416	1,148
In. mach gp	17	1,978	14,365	216	1,642	18,218	15,573	2,645
Boring maching	29	2,202	6,251	326	597	9,405	7,381	2,024
Met. work. mach.	1	1,222	5,835	8	304	7,370	6,758	612
Spec. indust. mach.	432	7,030	24,106	638	1,992	34,198	31,471	2,727
Soil prep. mach.	76	100	2,500	670	196	3,542	3,340	202
Cul. crop prot. mach.	16	46	912	4,128	102	5,204	5,122	82
Harvesting mach.	62	70	3,156	6,934	14	10,236	10,086	150
Dairy farm mach.	-	26	1,241	2	. 11	1,280	1,247	33
Agric. machinery	25	67	531	786	56	1,465	1,433	32
Tractors	78	84	158	454	36	810	806	4
Railway roll. stock								
Motor vehicles	33	2,497	100,431	2,399	237	105,597	94,672	10,925
Ships & boats	592	9,704	11,436	34	778	22,544	15,818	6,726
Aircraft	7	368	212	12	L ₊	603	544	59
Other vehicles	14	1,700	11,578	314	26	13,632	13,520	112
Rubber tyres tubes	-	344	3,846	12	3	4,205	2,314	1,891
Comm. equipment	25	3,442	5,224	44	114	8,849	7,845	1,004
Domestic equip.	5	320	1,575	36	54	1,990	1,787	203
Food sook equipment	1	20	361	7	2	391	271	120
Electrical equipment	-	319	1,286	32	104	1,741	1,374	367
Dom. laundry equip.	00	61	200	-	-	261	37	224
Misc. elect. equip.	3	20	237	15	12	287	264	23
Mens. lab. equip.	2	804	2,101	24	107	3,038	2,613	425
Furniture & equipment	62	909	1,219	36	139	2,365	2,307	58
Tools & cutlery	1	36	1,342	l _b	4	1,387	784	603
Off. mach. & equip.	-	427	6,006	1	1	6,435	4,982	1,453
Misc. equipment	20	236	748	14	10	1,028	893	135
Clothing	10	2,832	921	295	372	4,430	4,244	186
Footwear	14	588	101	3	7	703	687	16
Toilet preps.	-	21	199	2	22	244	207	37
Jewel silver .	-	-	1		-	1	1	-
Watches, clocks	-		8	-	-	8	1	7
Sports equip.	-	1,272	1,354	11	68	2,705	2,644	61
House furnishings	1	10	242	1	1	255	228	27
Kitchen ware	2	178	117	3	2 .	302	270	32
Household & per. equip.	1	410	383	1	5	800	738	62
Medical products	-	332	214	1	5	552	253	299
Opthal goods	-	2	150	-	-	152	134	18
Printed matter	7	1,212	1,854	214	95	3,382	3,240	142
Office supplies	-	77	415	5	23	520	438	82
Photographic goods	~	19	1,105	2	1	1,127	740	387
Musical instruments	_	212	77		7	296	296	-
Firearms & ammo.	7	311	746	3	1	1,068	1,021	47
Containers	80	495 1	2,594	173	304	3,646	3,273	373
Hisc. end prod.	71	1,756	4,906	284	1,000	8,017	7,125	892
Spec. trans.	111	256	2,166	1,348	259	4,140	4,045	95

U.S. CONSUMPTION TOTAL	IDAL IVIAL	4,066,011 3,968,417 97,594	3,968,417 1/tons 97,594 1/tons = 2.400239% 4,065,011 1/tons	465,26	
	BRITISH COLUMBIA	373,089	U.S. Consumption U.S. Leakage total	8,956	en en semble de materiale semble selven de service de la Company de seda del seda de seda de la del de la menos escledes e
SNOT	PRAIRIES	386,656		9,281	ena-PCHPMEA TOPA-A-SEC-uptors 2014; th. 15th. s. 1800; 1900; s. 1
IN LONG	ONTARIO	1,777,551		42,665	A STREET, Language on a real supplier of the party problems of the party of the par
BY REGIONS	QUEBEC	930,760		22,340	A do est sensitiva and a series of Photographics and a series of the
DEADWEIGHT	ATLANTIC	597,955		14,352	A 17 miles days of 21 this, of mentioned that majorate days and a 17 miles of the 17 miles of
ROAD (continued) COMMODITY				leakage by Apea, l/Tons	

* Source: D.B.S. # 65-206, - Converted from value in dollars to D.W.T. 1965

. . 183

TABLE V - 10 - b

DEADWEIGHT ANALYSIS, BY REGIONS OF PRODUCTION OF CANADIAN DOMESTIC GOODS EXPORTED INTO THE U.S. BY RAIL. ALSO, U.S. CONSUMPTION TOTAL AND "LEAKAGE"

17	es,	ø	L	A

66 11 2 31 1 147 72 316 493 3 3	90EBBC 318 1	ONTARIO 671 134 13 40 68 1,645 269 412 3,214 102 810 300 93 529 5,261 40 196 1 196 1 196 1 196 411 196 28	11,121 12 15 6 2,551 3 5 235 154 17 371 13 2	267	12, 177 185 25 29 41 2 114 4,552 295 9 29 1,781 4,497 254 1,374 385 245 2,169 5,195 533 202 1 19 377 65,885 45,310 2,156 37	11,750 134 18 29 38 2 14 4,508 293 6 1,781 4,490 4,594 1,374 383 194 2,114 5,193 459 202 1 366 63,776 34,712 2,156 36 51,712	10,
6 11 2 31 1 147 72 516 493 5 51 10	1	134 13 40 	12 15 15 6 2,551 5. 235 154 17 371 13 2 1 37 1 1,956 4,599	145 437 49 6 1145 116 6,568 5,276	1 * 5 2 5 2 9 4 1 2 1 1 4 ,552 2 9 5 9 2 9 1 ,781 4 ,497 2 9 1 4 ,497 2 9 1 1 3 7 4 5 2 ,169 5 ,193 5 7 7 6 5 ,085 4 5 ,310 2 ,156 3 7 5 5 2 0	18 29 38 29 14 4,508 293 6 1,781 4,490 254 1,374 383 194 2,114 5,193 202 1 366 65,776 34,712 2,156 2,56	
11 2 31 1 147 72 516 493 3 	21 1 985 681 133 113 63 1,568 1,565 1 - - 22,937 3,392 498 31	40 8 1,645 269 5 29 412 3,214 102 810 300 93 529 3,261 40 196 1 19 188 28,212 32,044 1,647 6 411 196	15 6 2,551 3 5 154 17 371 13 2 37 1 69 1,956 4,599 11	1 2	29 h1 2 11 4,552 295 9 29 1,781 4,497 25h 1,374 385 2,169 5,195 575 65,685 45,510 2,156 377 520	29 30 20 14 4,508 293 6 1,781 4,490 254 1,374 583 194 2,114 5,193 459 202 1 1 366 6 63,776 34,712 2,156 76 56	
11 2 31 1 147 72 516 493 3 	21 1 985 681 133 113 63 1,568 1,565 1 - - 22,937 3,392 498 31	40 	2,551 3 5. 235 154 17 371 13 2 - 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 2	hi 2 1h 4,552 295 9 29 1,781 4,497 25h 1,37h 383 245 2,169 5,193 533 202 1 1,9 377 65,885 45,310 2,156 377 520	3.6 2 14 4,508 293 6 6 1,701 4,490 254 1,374 2,114 5,193 459 202 1 366 63,776 34,712 2,156 35,776	
11 2 31 1 147 72 516 493 3 	21 1 985 681 133 113 63 1,568 1,565 1 - - 22,937 3,392 498 31	8 1,645 269 5 29 412 3,214 102 810 300 93 529 3,261 40 196 1 199 188 28,212 32,044 1,647 6 411 196	2,551 5. 233 154 17 371 13 2 - 37 1 - 69 1,956 4,599	2 	2 114 4,552 9 29 1,781 4,497 254 1,374 383 245 2,169 5,193 373 65,885 45,310 2,156 377	2 14,508 293 6 1,781 4,490 254 1,374 385 194 2,114 5,193 459 202 1 366 65,776 34,712 2,150 5,150	
11 2 31 1 147 72 516 493 3 	21 1 985 681 133 113 63 1,568 1,565 1 - - 22,937 3,392 498 31	1,645 269 29 412 3,214 102 810 300 93 529 3,261 40 196 1 19 188 28,212 32,044 1,647 6 411 196	2,551 3 5 - 255 154 17 371 13 2 - 1 - 69 1,956 4,599 11	437 49 6 	4,552 29 29 1,781 4,497 254 1,374 383 245 2,169 5,193 533 202 1 19 377 65,885 45,310 2,156 37 520	4,508 297 6 1,781 4,490 254 1,774 385 194 2,114 5,193 459 202 1 366 63,776 34,712 2,156 36	
11 2 31 1 147 72 516 493 3 	21 1 985 681 133 113 63 1,568 1,565 1 - - 22,937 3,392 498 31	269 3 29 412 3,214 102 810 300 95 529 3,261 40 196 11 199 188 28,212 32,044 1,647 6 411 196	75 5. 253 154 17 371 13 2 2 - 37 1 - 69 1,956 4,599	437 49 6 	295 9 29 1,781 4,497 254 1,374 385 245 2,169 5,195 533 202 1 19 577 65,885 45,310 2,156 377 520	293 6 1,781 4,490 254 1,374 383 194 2,114 5,193 459 202 1 366 63,776 34,712 2,150 3,715 6,350	
11 2 31 1 147 72 516 493 3 	985 691 133 163 3 1,568 1,565 1 22,937 3,392 498 31	5 29 412 3,214 102 810 300 93 529 3,261 40 196 1 1 19 188 28,212 52,044 1,647 6 411 196	5. 235 154 17 371 13 2 - 37 1 - 69 1,956 4,599	437 49 6 	9 29 1,781 4,497 254 1,374 383 245 2,169 5,193 202 1 9 37* 65,885 45,310 2,156 377 520	6 1,781 4,490 254 1,374 383 194 2,114 5,193 459 202 1 366 63,776 34,712 2,156 ,36	
11 2 31 1 147 72 516 493 3 	985 681 133 113 63 3 1,568 1,565 - 1 - - - - - - 1,569 3 1,565 - - 1,569 3 1,569 3 1,569 1	29 h12 3,214 102 810 300 93 529 3,261 40 196 1 1 19 188 28,212 32,044 1,647 6 h11 196	253 154 17 371 13 2 - 37 - 1 - 69 1,956 4,599 11	437 49 6 	29 1,761 4,497 254 1,374 285 2,169 5,197 2,169 5,197 202 1 1,9 377 65,885 45,310 2,156 377 520	4,490 254 1,374 383 194 2,114 5,193 459 202 1 366 63,776 34,712 2,156 36	
11 2 31 1 147 72 516 493 3 	691 133 133 63 3 1,568 1,565 1 1 - - 22,937 3,392 498 31	#12 3,214 102 810 300 93 529 3,261 40 196 11 19 188 28,212 32,044 1,647 6 411	15h 17 371 13 2 	437 49 6 	4,497 25h 1,374 383 245 2,169 5,193 533 202 1 19 377 63,885 45,310 2,156 377 520	4,490 254 1,374 383 194 2,114 5,193 459 202 1 366 63,776 34,712 2,156 36	
11 2 31 1 147 72 516 493 3 	691 133 133 63 3 1,568 1,565 1 1 - - 22,937 3,392 498 31	102 810 300 93 529 3,261 40 196 1 19 188 28,212 32,044 1,647 6 411	17 371 13 2 - 37 1 - 69 1,956 4,599 11	14 -1 116 6,568 5,276	254 1,374 383 245 2,169 5,193 202 1 19 377 65,885 45,310 2,156 37	254 1,77h 383 19h 2,11h 5,193 459 202 1 366 63,776 3h,712 2,156 36	
31 147 72 316 493 5 	113 63 7 1,568 1,565 1 	810 300 95 529 3,261 40 196 1 19 188 28,212 32,044 1,647 6 411 196	371 13 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	6 14 1 1 116 6,*68 5,276	1,374 383 245 2,169 5,193 533 202 1 19 377 63,885 45,310 2,156 37 520	1,37h 383 19h 2,11h 5,193 459 202 1 366 63,776 3h,712 2,150 36	
1 147 72 516 493 5 	63 3 1,568 1,565 - 1 - - - 22,937 3,392 498 31	300 93 529 3,261 40 196 1 19 188 28,212 32,044 1,647 6 411	13 2 37 1 - 69 1,956 4,599	6 14 1 1 116 6,*68 5,276	285 2,169 5,195 5,195 573 202 1 19 377 63,885 45,310 2,156 37 520	383 194 2,114 5,193 459 202 1 366 63,776 34,712 2,150 36	
147 72 316 493 3 - - 4,412 9 - 34 - - 51	7 1,568 1,565 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	95 529 3,261 40 196 1 19 188 28,212 32,044 1,647 6 411	2 37 1 69 1,956 4,599 11	14 1 - 116 6,568 5,276 -	2,169 5,193 533 202 1 19 377 63,885 45,310 2,156 37 520	2,11h 5,193 459 202 1 366 63,776 34,712 2,150	
72 316 493 3 	22,937 3,392 498 31	7,261 40 196 1 19 188 28,212 32,044 1,647 6 411	1 69 1,956 4,599 11	1 1.6 6,568 5,276	5,193 533 202 1 19 377 63,885 45,310 2,156 37 520	5,193 459 202 1 36 63,776 31,712 2,150 36	
493 5 - 4,412 9 - 34 - 51	22,937 3,392 498 31	40 196 1 19 188 28,212 32,044 1,647 6 411	1 69 1,956 4,599 11	1 1.6 6,568 5,276	577 202 1 19 377 63,885 45,310 2,156 37 520	459 202 1 - 366 63,776 34,712 2,156 36	
3	22,937 3,392 498 31	196 1 19 188 28,212 32,044 1,647 6 411 196	- 69 1,956 4,599 11 72	1 - 116 6,568 5,276 -	202 1 19 377 63,885 45,310 2,156 37 520	202 1 366 63,776 34,712 2,156 36	
4,412 . 9 . 34 . 51	22,937 3,392 498 31	1 19 188 28,212 32,044 1,647 6 411	- 69 1,956 4,599 11 72	6,368 5,276 - - 3	19 377 63,885 45,310 2,156 37 520	366 63,776 34,712 2,156 36	
9 - 34 - - 51 10	3,392 498 31 109	188 28,212 32,044 1,647 6 411 196	1,956 4,599 11 72	6,368 5,276 - - 3	377 63,885 45,310 2,156 37 520	63,776 31,712 2,156 36	
9 - 34 - - 51 10	3,392 498 31 109	28,212 32,044 1,647 6 411 196	1,956 4,599 11 72	6,368 5,276 - - 3	63,885 45,310 2,156 37 520	63,776 31,712 2,156 36	
9 - 34 - - 51 10	3,392 498 31 109	32,044 1,647 6 411 196	4,599 11 72	5,276 - - 3	45,310 2,156 37 520	34,712 2,156 36	
9 - 34 - - 51 10	3,392 498 31 109	32,044 1,647 6 411 196	4,599 11 72	5,276 - - 3	45,310 2,156 37 520	34,712 2,156 36	10,
51 10	498 31 109	1,647 6 411 196	11	- - 3	2,156 37 520	36	
51	109	6 411 196			520	,	
51	109	196				71.17	
51 10			0,001	1,170	7,562	6,578	
10	-		_	1,272	294	195	
10	-						
10	-	-	-	-	51	51 833	
22,525		1	-	822	855	023	
61767	8,498	5,813	764	1.044	38,644	38,457	
18	0,490	136	-	-	154	154	
150	-	-	-	•	150	150	
-	-	648	-	-	648 oh	440	
46	1 *70					10,128	
-			_	-	193	193	
	1,864	94	-	**	1,958	1,958	
	,						
		36			36	36	
-	15			-	19	15	
-	15	(4					
-	-	41	-	-	41	-	
**	-	1	-	-		2h	
-	8		3 1	-			
-	40	1,005	1	176	217	217	
50	354	49	18	-	441	441	
146	52,747	59.256	19,111	15,203			
-0		75	h 681				
5.047				10,549	27,602	27,602	
1,1041	35	127	-	-	162	144	
					110	110	
49	11	55	807	2 587			
*			001	2,701	1,200	353	
_	3	-	-	-	3	Z	
	501	2,192	393	1,048	4,134	3,99%	
	19	-	19	69			
-	-		1,071	-		26	
-				-	1	1	
48	23	181	-	1	504	50#	
**	69	1,949	2.236	18			1
44	-						1
-			2	197		34	
-	10	Les					
-	-	18	-	*	19	19	
748	50,041	42,033					
254	21	6,915	5	-			
10	1.288	0.027	20.216	3.802	34,357	×4,33%	
56.643		491,710	20,624	, , , , ,	585,704	585,704	
J. 10	1					1	
					4		
	,	1					
	1	1	!				
	200 146	- 1,379 - 161 - 1,864 - 15 - 8 - 8 - 40 20 20 354 146 52,747 625 - 18,645 992 35 - 11 - 5,419 - 11 - 3 - 501 - 19 - 11 - 23 - 69 - 25 - 16 748 234 21 10 - 1,288	1 1,379 8,749 1,379 8,749 161 32 1,864 94 - 1,864 94 - 15 36 - 15 41 - 8 16 - 1,605 - 40 1,605 - 18,645 45,697 5,047 992 9,066 - 18,645 45,697 - 5,047 992 9,066 - 11 1,189 - 5,419 11,480 - 11 1,189 - 5,419 11,480 - 11 1,189 - 501 2,192 - 19 1,216 - 25 18,18 - 69 1,040 - 18 - 69 5,448 - 18 - 18 - 18 - 18 - 18 - 18 - 18 - 1	1 1,379	1 1,379	1 1,579 8,749 - 10,128	1

RAIL (Continued)

	ATLANTIC	QUEBEC	CHTARIO	PRAIRLES	BRITISH COLUMBIA	TOTAL	CONTIMETION FOR	LEAR 1/1
ood Mats, Crude	667	15,454	19,600		1		,	1/2
ool, Animal Heir	-	State	122	9,387	773	45,880 744	45,707	1
nimel Hair, Fibre	-	115	6:6		- 1	751	7114	1
eg. Tex. Fibres	-	609	185	-	- !	70/1	794	
ynthetic Fibres	-	1,121	544	76	-	658	558	
ron Ore, Con. Serap	1,565	A,710	1,301,041	4,735	4,400	1,808	1,741	
lum. Ores, Scrap opper Ore, Con. Scrap	19	1,907	13,261	591	1,161	16,539	16,410	
ead Ore, Con. Scrap		1,000	1,675	*22	1,499	4,510	4,510	
ickel Ore, Con. Scrap	-	78	8,761	3,015	24,300	29,416	29,416	
rec. Met. in O.C.S. inc Ores, C. & S.	-	2	41	7	106	156	8,778	
ther Met. Ores.		9,575	147,965	5,520	27,077	189,937	; 188,957	í
oal	41,300	1 157	10,812	8,861	189	11,642	17,351	
rude Bit. Subs.		-	67	3,017	19,783	70,00° 3,080	70,60	
sheatos, Unman. lay & Other Ref. M.	1	219,221	329,247	2,093	7,813	55/L 379	3,080 545,963	
brasives	-	2,961	1,259	-		4,10	4,220	
and & Gravel	5,411	1,579	1,029		221	7.5	* 5	
tone, Crude		29,113	14,679		40,314	5 ** 92 , 4/6	5,, 71	
rude Non-M. Mats.	30	335	21,165	14,275	28,660	Ch. 1.C.	12,400 54,445	
aste & Scrap Mats. eather & L. Fab.	843	26,692	38,685	6,*88	10,295	90,000	82,085	
ir Dressed & Fab.	_	1 1	171	3	-	1.75	57	
bber Fab. Mats.	-	ŕ	116	1	la la	, 118	3	
mber	19,2 m	376,762	2,230,716	1,587,615	406,899	4,621.262	4 671, 29	
ilway Ties wmill Products	28	367	45	-	-	440	440	
ncer Plywood	610	48,080	51,480	107,910	95,510	303,540	303,310	
llwork	-	19,719	129,090	1,145	6,915	156,495	156,425	
her Wood Mats.	85	430	710	405	370	1,585 2,510	1,585	
od Pulps Inting Eaper	170,370	436,765	899,756	243,565	137,903	1,888,328	2,500	
nc Paper	16,518	982,153	1,509,803	367,541	290,805	3,166,820	3,153,479	[*]
srue & San. Paper		30 30	11.4 621	46	. 0.00	336	320	
apping Paper	_	302	5,857	731	398	1,595	576	
. in & C. Paper	~	×85	69	-		6,890 454	6,890	
perboard Ilding Faper B.	-	445	1,822	-	105	2,702	2,392	
t Muchine Board	19	9,496	14,613	13	16,972	41,113	11,112	
nverted Paper	-	280	217 165	5	- 1	217	217	
rn & Throad	-	50	18	7 ~	50	26 7 Ju	h=5	
rd, Teine & Rope	-	271	14,591	18	- 1	14,000	34,990	
cad Woven Fabrics	-	636	-		- 1	676	636	
her Fabrics	- 1	21,	- A	-	59	61	50	
ec Tex. Fab. Mats.	-	26		-		1/n	'; ~),	
imal Oils & Fats	-	-	94	127		1 3	77.2	
sh & Morine Oils	24	540	55	79	1 १७७३	+ 14	(A)	
c. Oils & Fats ls, Fats, Waxes, A & V		?2 77	116 643	1.	-	1 * 1	179	
n. Wood & Veg. Extract	_	5,137	5,536	1,710		17,773	20 1	
omical Elements	2,406	29,072	4,431	1,110	1	35,000	12,846	
Acid & Ox. Comps.	-	2 1,1	27,848	-	1,609	20,003	29,901	
Bases & M. Oxides C. Salts in. Acid		1,782	14,762	116	10,638	17,898	17,298	
org. Chemicals	_	13,884	39,517 616	57,993	18,078	129,432	125,003	2k ,
nols, E.A. & D.	-	512	1,415		943	1,020 2,971	998	
an. Chemicals	-	10,645	68,830	1,629		81,104	2,358 76,832	1,
t. & Fort. Mats.	26,940	41,100	644,200	474,260	471,140	1,657,640	1,657,640	,
osives		*a	0.7	* .	1		1	
stics & Syn. Rubber		34 357	17,365	31 415	17	107	75	
st. Shepes & Forms	_	5	61	1 ,	1	18,117 68	7,817	۱٦,
9, P.L. & T.	~	126	18		-	144	142	
nt & Products ust. Chem. & Ex.	- ;	6	8	1	2	17	10	
oline	_	155	2,367	7li 29 i	136	2,692	1,1	
1 011	-	166	781	393		29	, 0	
. Oi) & Greases	-	42	271	727	1,191	2,531	7,5*1	
	~	47 :	11,001	**	63,580	74,636	74,656	
ol & Coal Prods.	- ,	6,300	69,650	210,550	60,600	347,100	*1.7.*(O	
1. Iron & Steel		16,137	91,049	ho. ma	114 1140	12,090	11,85%	;
ings & Forgings	-	477	10,477	7. ()	14,240 c	160,164	162,164	
s & Rods. Steel	-	160	10,840	31	617	11,669	10,958	1,2
1, F.S.S.	- 1	5	222,707	~	² (1) (223,036	191,926	1 42
get, S. & S.P. Is & Track Mats	•	h/2 1	5,614		2,578	8,104	7,777	1
n, Steel, Pipes, Tubes	_ :	463	6,201 ×4,468	507	14911	7,1 4	7,154	
n, Steel Wire Rope	1 *	418	539	50*	2,19/ 21:	77,167	77,721 640	0,1
					, ,	1.54	(440)	1

RAIL (Continued)

COMMODITY							CONSUMPTION	LEAKA
the state of the s	ATLANTIC	QUEBEC	ONTARIO	PRAIRIES	BRITISH COLUMBIA	TOTAL	TOTAL	L/TO
Aluminum & Alloys	-	124,272	158,101	6,311	12,090	300,774	299,374	1,4
Copper & Alloys	-	42,391	22,969	-	531	65,891	65,548	3
Lead & Alloys	-	829	25	20,008	7,729	28,189	28,189	
Nickel & Alloys		756	47,807	*37	-	48,900	48,754	11
Prec. Met. Inc. Alloys	-	. ~	42		-	42	42	
Zinc & Alloys	-	5,145	29,441	42,425	*,625	80,636	80,583	
Mon-Ferrous, M. & A.	- 1	5	533	790	-	1,728	1,249	1
Hre Fencing, S & N.		368	291	**	-	659	659	
Abrasive Products	-	25,521	136,624	96	-	162,241	160,919	1,30
Convey. Ele. Equip.	-	116	406	14	18	544	518	
Bolts, Nuts & B.H.	76	76	1,190	32	2	1,376	526	8
Walves & Pipe Fittings	-	10	104	7.	2	116	112	
Metal Fab. Basics.	la la	4,312	9,228	332	176	14,092	13,556	5
Clay Bricks & Tiles	2	2,242	4,550	8	240	7,042	6,864	1
Hass Basic Products	~	en en	4	ris	5	6	6	
Asbestos & As. Cement	-	712	316	-	-	1,028	998	
Gement & Concrete	-	24	20	240	16	300	288	
Mon-Met. Min. Prods.	-	48	3,200	56	1,796	5,070	4,702	2
is. Fab. Mats.		1,008	692	36	10	1,746	1,558	1
n. Mach. G. P.	37	550	3,582	278	11	4,128	2,906	1,3
aking Machinery	-	67	1,721	96	211	2,095	1,664	1
et. Work. Mach.	-	21	1,876	-	-	1,897	1,000	1
pec. Indust. Mach.	40	2,425	5,068	37	164	7,694	6,089	1,6
oil Prep. Mach.	18	142	56,580	50	- 1	56,760	54,684	5,0
ul. Crop. Prot. Mach.	Łs.	72	20,432	136	68	20,712	20,348	1 3
arvesting Mach.	24	46	64,206	412	1	64,688	60,422	14,2
eiry Ferm Mach.	-	8	37	-	- 1	45	145	
gric. Machinery	an an	1.3	151	13	3	180	169	1
ractors		-	286	-	- 1	286	236	
allway Roll. Stock	25	120	2,806	69	-	3,020	1,190	1,5
otor Vehicles	144	291	37,275	7	123	37,840	8,504	29,5
Bhips & Boats	12	54	568	14	55	660	400	2
drereft	-	7	100	No.	-	107	106	
ther Vehicles	-	140	17,366	en.	-	17,506	17,054	1
ubber Tires, Tubes	-	82	415	***	-	497	333	1
omm. Equipment	-	374	599	1	2	976	922	
omestic Equip.	- 1	8	1,875	-	-	1,883	1,819	
ond Cook. Equip.	-	*46	75		-	75 885	75 524	1
lect. Equip.	-	1.6	868	1	-	885	524	
om. Laundry Equip.	-	55	53		- 1	108	55	
isc. Elect. Equip.	-	3	8	1	-	12	5	
eas. Lab. Equip.	-	331	218	1.1	7	567	523	
erniture & Equip.	-	50	151	14	11	556	223	
ocla & Cuthery	-	1	25	-	2	28	25	
ff. Moch. & Equip.	-	13	115	***	-	128	118	
isc. Equipment	-	5	52	-	-	57	54	
Lothfux	-	58	165	35	33	291	281	1
oolweer	-	3	25	-		28	27	
oflet Props.	- 1		12	3	13	28	28	
evel Silver	-	2	200	-	-	2	2	
stches. Clocks	-	10		-	-	-		
ports, Equip.	-	7	60	1	1	69	69	
ouse Furnishings	-	5	150	ī	i	157	157	
itchen Were	-	10	10	1	2	23	17	
!! & Per. Equip.	-	63	29	-	_	92	92	
dical Products	-	7	-7	600	-	1.0	9	
pthal. Goods	_	, s	6			8	8	
rinted Mutter	-	174	195	28	16	413	391	
ffice Supplies		2	16	3	10	21	21	
hoto. Goods		14	33	1		38	27	
usical Instruments		*	23	1.		277 2%	23	
irearms & Ammo.		29	315			544	544	
ontsiners		29 93	584	10	110			
oateiners Usc. Snd Prods.	-		584 467	19		745	715	
pec. Trans.		852	457 869	156	286	1,761	1,296	
pro Crans.		6	860	131	174	1,180	1.420	

	37h, 817	2,763,420	2,490,172	7,347,742	1,872,078	17,805,197	17,649,910	156,287
				U.S. Consumption Leakage Total		48,910 56,287 05,197		
Leakage by Area, L/Tons	3,290	23,949	85,231	29,385	16,432	156,297		

SOURCE: D.B.S. No. 65-206, - Converted from Value in Dollars to D.W.T. 1965

ALL LONG TONS

of the cargoes. Further, the U.S. Government will receive a portion of this increase through taxation.

One Canadian port estimates its revenue per short ton of cargo to be 8.54%. On that basis, Canadian ports in 1966 were deprived of approximately \$36,313 of revenue due to leakage.

Let us now turn our attention to what the Montreal locals 375, 1657, and 1552 lost or gained by the strike. Assuming there to be some 3,500 longshoremen in Montreal it can be calculated that over the thirty-eight day strike at their old base rate of \$2.63 per hour and assuming they would have worked eight hours per day with no overtime, the strike cost them \$2,798,320 or approximately \$800.00 per person. If they had accepted the last offer by the Federation prior to the strike however they would have received 25¢ per hour for the thirty-eight days plus 10¢ per hour retroactive to January 1, 1966. Since they had worked 672,353 man hours prior to the strike that means they would have received an additional \$67,235 in retroactive pay plus \$3,064,320 for the thirty-eight days for a total of \$3,131,555. However they forewent that increase gambling that after a strike they would come out "better off" in the long run.

In the final terms of settlement the members received 40¢ retroactive to January 1, 1966 for all hours worked prior to the strike for a total of \$268,941.

Further it has been calculated from the daily work sheet that

the men made \$3,418,535 at time and one half, \$326,537 at double time, \$16,407 at triple time and \$5,059,942 at regular time after the strike. When the retroactive pay is added to this the total amounts to \$9,090,362 for 1966.

Assuming the level of activity anticipated for the year to approximate that of 1965, let us compare the 1965 earnings to those of 1966. In 1965 the longshoremen earned \$5,500,897 at regular time (base rate \$2.63), \$3,279,392 at time and a half, \$341,195 at double time and \$10,193 at triple time for a grand total of \$9,131,677. It may be noted that the total income of longshoremen in 1965 exceeded that paid to them in 1966 by \$41,315.

However the number of man hours worked under the various headings varied as follows:

COMPARA	ATIVE MAN-HOURS BY R	ATE 1965-1966	
Rate	1965	1966	Difference
Regular time	2,091,596	1,669,948	- 421,648
11/2	832,333	752,153	- 80,180
2	64,866	53,884	- 10,982
3	1,292	1,805	+ 513

Assuming the pattern of activity in the port would have been the same in 1966 as it was in 1965 had there not been a strike, one can estimate that had the longshoremen accepted the 25¢ per hour and not gone

- 188 -

on strike, collectively they would have earned \$10,004,265. However, by electing to go on strike they only received \$9,090,362 or \$913,903 less than they would have realized had they not gone on strike. This means that on an individual basis the men on the average failed to realize approximately a \$261 increase in their wages for 1966.

This however does not mean that they lost this amount. As was pointed out above they collectively earned \$41,315 less in 1966 than in 1965 and so one might say that they lost about \$11.80 per man by going on strike.

Even if one considers their unrealized earnings as lost because of the strike, it becomes evident that it will only take them 59 working days at the increased rate to make this up. Thus it is reasonable to conclude that over the duration of their contract, the longshoremen came out "better off" than they would have had they not gone on strike. Another point to consider is that during the next negotiations their base is much higher than it would have been without the strike.

In conclusion then one must say that the persons who suffered most because of the strike immediately were on the management side. However, the cost will undoubtedly be passed on to the shipper and thence to the consumer although the effect may not be evident for some time. It is safe to say that this increase of 30% will not reverse the inflationary spiral; in fact it will probably add to it even if only a small amount.

Perhaps the main reason for the concern which this dispute

- 189 -

aroused may be attributed to two factors:

- 1. Expo '67' construction could have been seriously retarded by a further delay, and
- 2. the usual political and economic pressure exerted by Red China and Russia to get the wheat moving again.

For the future it appears highly probable that the forthcoming negotiations will terminate in a strike situation. Renegotiations do not normally require the presence of the International President, Mr. Gleason. However, the Toronto Locals 1842 and 1869 have requested that Mr. Gleason and his staff economists in New York make themselves available. Mr. Gleason has agreed since his agreements are not up for renegotiation at this time.

At present it appears that Mr. Gleason's intention over a ten to fifteen year period is to consolidate all I.L.A. contracts on the North American continent and eventually obtain a single contract extending from the Canadian Lakehead to Texas. One might suspect that, apart from personality differences which exist within the union, the physical and climatic differences present in Canada would prevent such an agreement.

In October, 1967, Mr. Gleason advanced the suggestion that he with the assistance of his staff economists in New York would prepare a brief for presentation to the Shipping Federation of Canada which would set out the Union's proposals relating to the payment of a royalty on containers and a guaranteed wage. Further he indicated that when agree-

ment on these major issues, which are designed to cover the seven

Canadian ports, is reached matters peculiar to the individual ports would

be negotiated separetely.

The problem which apparently exists in the uniform contract proposal is that Mr. Gleason does not fully comprehend the complexities and nuances which dominate the Canadian scene. Our ports are in fact very different from those on the U.S. Eastern Seabord. The U.S. ports are open all year round as are Halifax and St. John in Canada, but they are farther advanced insofar as technological improvements are concerned. The remainder of the Canadian ports covered by I.L.A. agreements operate on approximately a nine month schedule. Thus the differences in the length of the season alone may play an important role in stevedoring operations.

Until the intervention of Mr. Gleason the prime issues for the forthcoming negotiations were, and to a large degree still are, containerization, unitization and job security. The first issue has been somewhat confused now by the proposal for a royalty to be applied to containers. Other issues which may precipate a strike will be examined in connection with the recent Picard Commission's recommendations.

went on thems major inches, which are designed to cover the seven Canadian ports, is reached matters provider to one instruction and to be negotiated separately.

The problem which apparently estate in the unitare designation of the proposal of the first Mr. Wissen which dominate the Canadian when the companion of the proposal of the Canadian which dominate the Canadian which designate are the Canadian of the Canadian technological increvements are scottled as are faithful increvements are scottled as a contract of the canadian ports toward by I.L.A. agreements of the canadian ports toward by I.L.A. agreements of the canadian of the canadian are something the canadian and play as important role in specialists.

Until the intervention and to a large degree will are, consumed to consumer to the constant of the constant of

A CONTROL OF THE PROPERTY OF T

TECH A RES



